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Abstract
Energy policy needs to rely on the proper understanding of the interactions between policy instru-
ments, consumer preferences, investment behavior, market structure, electricity supply, and the
wider policy environment. This asks for appropriate modeling tools, able to represent precisely
electricity supply options, model all types of energy and climate policies, as well as the reactions of
the rest of the economy.
Chapter 2 describes the ELECTRA-CH framework, developed to analyze electricity markets in
Switzerland. This framework is composed of two component models: (1) a dynamic electricity
supply model, CROSSTEM-CH, and (2) a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
of the Swiss economy, GENESwIS. The two models are coupled through an iterative soft link.
Electricity market liberalization is altering pricing mechanisms in wholesale electricity markets, and
thus the links between generation costs and user prices. This will aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of climate
and energy policies. Models used to simulate such policies must be responsive to pricing rules.
Chapter 3 shows how this can be done with the ELECTRA-CH framework and simulates a tightening
of climate and energy policies. In the coupling procedure, the link between wholesale electricity prices
(top-down) and generation costs (bottom-up) depends precisely on regulatory market assumptions:
In the regulated market, wholesale electricity prices are "cost-plus", while they depend on marginal
generation costs in the liberalized market. We show that, in Switzerland, an electricity tax is
signiﬁcantly more eﬀective in reducing electricity demand in the liberalized than in the regulated
market.
Technology restrictions are still widely used in energy policy. Concerns about security, climate, or
jobs preservation induce political quasi-selections of electricity generation technologies. Instruments
inherited from regulation, technology restrictions may have diﬀerent impacts on the economy when
markets are largely liberalized. In chapter 4, we analyze (1) a balanced-trade scenario in which
Switzerland’s annual electricity production must be equal to its consumption; and (2) a no-gas
scenario that forbids gas-ﬁred power plants, but accepts net electricity imports. For Switzerland,
the prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants and relaxation of trade constraints lower average cost while
increasing marginal cost. With marginal cost pricing in liberalized markets, this increases proﬁts.
Reduction in total system cost and increase in electricity price aﬀect welfare in opposite ways. A
pure bottom-up analysis would overestimate the beneﬁts of technology restrictions.
Our framework’s strength lies in the capacity of exploring interactions in a complex economic
system, rather than in strict policy recommendations. Therefore, in this thesis, the emphasis is put
on the understanding of mechanisms. At the end of this research, it has been shown that energy
modelers must communicate and temper their results carefully. While much has been said about
the impact of assumptions on substitution elasticities and exogenous costs projections on modeling
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results, this research adds to the awareness on the eﬀects of market liberalization assumptions and
choice of modeling framework on policy assessment.
Keywords: energy policy, electricity markets, market liberalization, energy modeling, top-down
model, bottom-up model, soft-link coupling, general equilibrium.
Résumé
Une politique énergétique judicieuse s’appuie sur la compréhension des interactions entre les instru-
ments politiques, les préférences des consommateurs, le comportement des investisseurs, l’oﬀre en
électricité, et l’environnement politique au sens large. Pour ceci, l’on a besoin de s’appuyer sur des
outils de modélisation appropriés qui ont les capacités de représenter de manière précise et adéquate
les options d’oﬀre d’électricité, les instruments des politiques énergétique et climatique, ainsi que
les réactions de l’économie en général.
Le chapitre 2 présente le modèle ELECTRA-CH, développé en vue d’analyser les marchés de
l’électricité en Suisse. Il se compose de deux modèles : (1) un modèle dynamique d’oﬀre de
l’électricité - CROSSTEM-CH - et (2) un modèle dynamique d’équilibre général calculable de
l’économie suisse - GENESwIS. Les deux modèles sont couplés à l’aide d’une méthode itérative
d’échange de variables (soft-link).
La libéralisation des marchés de l’électricité change la façon dont les prix de gros de l’électricité sont
déterminés, et par conséquent le lien entre les coûts de génération et le prix facturé à l’utilisateur
ﬁnal. Cela peut modiﬁer l’eﬃcience des politiques énergétiques et climatiques. Par conséquent,
les modèles utilisés pour simuler ces politiques doivent prendre en compte la façon dont les prix
sont déterminés, ce que nous proposons au chapitre 3 avec le modèle ELECTRA-CH. Lors du
couplage des deux modèles, le lien entre les prix de gros de l’électricité (modèle top-down) et les
coûts de générations (modèle bottom-up) dépend précisément des hypothèses sur la libéralisation du
marché : pour un marché régulé, les prix de gros sont déterminés à prix coûtant majoré, alors qu’ils
dépendent des coûts marginaux de production dans un marché libre. Nous simulons un durcissement
des politiques climatiques et énergétiques pour deux hypothèses de libéralisation du marché et
montrons que, pour la Suisse, une taxe sur l’électricité réduit la consommation d’électricité de
manière plus signiﬁcative dans un marché libre que dans un marché régulé.
Les restrictions technologiques sont omniprésentes en politique de l’énergie. En eﬀet, de préoccu-
pations concernant - entre autre - la sécurité, le climat, ou la protection de l’emploi, peuvent naitre
des choix politiques en rapport avec les technologies de production de l’électricité. Communément
utilisées sous régulation, les restrictions technologiques peuvent avoir un impact diﬀérent lorsque
les marchés sont largement libéralisés. Au chapitre 4, nous analysons (1) un scénario dans lequel
la production indigène et la demande d’électricité annuelle suisse doivent se compenser ; et (2) un
scénario "sans gaz" qui interdit la construction de centrales électriques au gaz, mais accepte des
importations annuelles nettes d’électricité. Pour la Suisse, l’interdiction de construire des centrales
à gaz et la relaxation des contraintes sur les importations d’électricité baissent le coût moyen de
l’électricité, tout en augmentant le coût marginal. Dans le cas d’un marché libéralisé - où le prix de
gros dépend du coût marginal - cela augmente les proﬁts. La diminution du coût total de production
et l’augmentation du prix de l’électricité ont des eﬀets opposés sur le bien-être. Une analyse se
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basant purement sur un modèle de type bottom-up surestimerait les bénéﬁces d’une telle politique.
La capacité d’explorer les interactions dans un système économique complexe fait la force de notre
modèle. Ainsi, cette thèse se concentre sur la compréhension des mécanismes en jeux, et ne
se lance pas dans des recommandations et prédictions par rapport aux politiques analysées. A
l’aboutissement de cette recherche, il ressort qu’une communication minutieuse des résultats et
particulièrement des modèles et hypothèses utilisés est cruciale. Alors que les impacts des choix
liés aux élasticités de substitution et aux coûts exogènes sont bien connus, cette recherche souligne
l’importance des hypothèses sur la libéralisation des marchés et du type de modèle utilisé pour
l’évaluation des politiques étudiées.
Mots clefs: politique énergétique, marchés de l’électricité, libéralisation des marchés, modélisa-
tion, modèle d’équilibre général calculable, modèle d’oﬀre de l’électricité, couplage soft-link
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Energy policy transitions may be initiated by multiple drivers, ranging from concerns about en-
ergy supply security, reduction of energy intensity or pollution-related health issues, to political
agreements to mitigate climate change.
Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Swiss Government took the decision to redeﬁne its
energy policy. The Swiss Federal council put forward the Energy Strategy 2050, which aims for an
energy supply for Switzerland that is cost-eﬀective, respectful of the environment and safe.
In accordance with this strategy, nuclear power plants are to be decommissioned at the end of
their "safe" operational lifetime and not replaced by new nuclear plants. It is yet unclear whether
a time-limit will be set on the operation of nuclear plants, or if they will be allowed to run as long
as safety standards are met. With the phase-out of nuclear, projected electricity supply options
rely on renewables and, if necessary, gas-ﬁred combined-cycle power plants and combined heat and
power plants.
While the Swiss Energy Strategy 2050 plans to foster energy eﬃciency improvements and promote
renewables, the nature of the policies to be put in place in this regard - namely the replacement
from 2020 of the existing promotion system by incentive mechanisms - is still under discussion.
Also in transition and under discussion is the liberalization of Swiss electricity markets. Currently,
Swiss electricity markets are partly liberalized: Large consumers (annual consumption > 100 MWh)
can choose their supplier and decide to pay market prices instead of regulated tariﬀs. Full market
liberalization has been postponed and will depend on the advancement of the legislative work on
the Energy Strategy 2050, the situation of the electricity market, and the negotiations with the
European Union regarding the full integration of the Swiss electricity market into the European
electricity market, which are still ongoing.
Energy policy needs to rely on the proper understanding of the interactions between policy instru-
ments, consumer preferences, investment behavior, market structure, electricity supply, and the
wider policy environment. Gaining such an insight on the mechanisms at work helps taking into
account the transient state of both policy landscape and energy markets, which is essential for
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designing adaptable policies that can be adequately modiﬁed to reach the objectives in changing
policy environments.
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the interplay between the electricity market and the
economy in changing policy environments. This asks for an appropriate modeling tool, able to
represent precisely electricity supply options, model all types of energy and climate policies, as well
as the reactions of the rest of the economy.
1.1 The choice of an appropriate modeling tool
Climate and energy policy analysis is mostly informed by two modeling approaches: bottom-up and
top-down.
Bottom-up models are based on extensive technological detail and are very well suited to model
technology choices. They are typically set as partial equilibrium models of the energy sector(s)
and maximize total surplus, although some models - like the CROSSTEM model used in this work
- take exogenous vertical demand functions and minimize total system cost. Bottom-up models
therefore lack feedback from the economy, and particularly macro-economic reactions to policy
shocks. Moreover, their optimization nature requires an eﬃcient allocation of resources, which
prevents them from taking into account ineﬃciencies such as initial tax distortions, income eﬀects
or market failures. Bottom-up models can implement precisely command-and-control policies as
well as technological constraints. However, due to integrability constraints, ad-valorem taxes aren’t
implemented easily in mathematical programing (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008).
Top-down models are aggregated, consistent macro-economic frameworks with micro-economic
foundations that simulate the interactions between consumers, producers and the public sector.
Typically, they display smooth production functions with elasticities of substitution, calibrated on
benchmark values. Moreover, they are often written as mixed complementary problems (MCP) in
which each constraint that is associated with an income eﬀect must be linked to a shadow variable.
The introduction of discrete technologies hence increases complexity and dimensionality very quickly
(Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008, 2009). This prevents top-down models from adequately modeling
discrete technologies, technical constraints and worlds very diﬀerent from today’s. These models
are designed to assess market-based policies and very well suited to investigate second-best-world
situations with initial tax distortions. However, they struggle to incorporate technology-speciﬁc or
command-and-control policies adequately.
The combination of top-down and bottom-up models into a single framework (Hourcade et al.,
2006) endeavors to incorporate the technological explicitness of bottom-up models with the micro-
economic representation of agents’ behavior in a general equilibrium of ﬂexible markets provided by
top-down models. A lot of eﬀort has been devoted to developing and assessing coupling methods
since the ﬁrst coupling by Hoﬀman and Jorgenson (1977). Two main currents emerged: "hard
linking", which encompasses the two model types into one single model, and "soft linking", which
couples existing full-size models by exchange of variables (Wene, 1996).
The hard linking methodology may be implemented by enhancing one model with a reduced version
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of the other; whether by adding a highly aggregate representation of macro-economic reactions in a
bottom-up optimization framework (Manne and Wene, 1992; Messner and Schrattenholzer, 2000;
Bosetti et al., 2006; Kannan et al., 2008), or by embedding a set of discrete generation technolo-
gies into a dop-down model (Böhringer, 1998; Kombaroglu and Madlener, 2003; Sue Wing, 2006;
Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008), or by writing a hybrid model directly as a mixed complementary
problem (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008; Frei et al., 2003). This methodological choice insures
consistency within the model but does not permit a high level of detail in both technical speciﬁcation
and economic interactions.
The "soft link" coupling method (Drouet et al., 2005; Schäfer and Jacoby, 2005; Martinsen, 2011;
Sceia et al., 2012; Riekkola et al., 2013; Fortes et al., 2014) involves keeping the models’ full
structure and complexity, exchanging a chosen set of variables and solving the models iteratively
until convergence is reached on a given criterion. It has the advantage to permit the use of full-scale
models with full dimensionally and complexity. However, Böhringer and Rutherford (2009) warn of
the dangers of inter-model inconsistencies and convergence issues when soft-coupling models with
fundamentally diﬀerent logics. They decompose a mixed complementary problem hybrid model
and solve it iteratively, proposing a more consistent way of soft-coupling models. This approach
inspired implementations by Tuladhar et al. (2009), Lanz and Rausch (2011), and Rausch and
Mowers (2014) - the latter with full-scale models.
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the interplay between the electricity market and the
economy in changing policy environments. This goal inﬂuences the choice of coupling method.
First, electricity is a speciﬁc commodity which cannot be easily stored. Supply and demand must
balance at each moment to maintain the stability of the network. A careful and detailed modeling of
time-periods, load-curves and technological potentials is crucial. Such technical precision requires
a detailed electricity supply model. Second, we endeavor to analyze changing policy environments.
This involves existing policies and their resulting distortions. Adding an aggregate representation
of macro-economic reactions to a bottom-up optimization framework is therefore not optimal, as
integrability constraints prevent these models from including distortionary taxes (Böhringer and
Rutherford, 2008, 2009). Furthermore, electricity is a commodity that is used by all sectors and
households. It is hence instructive to adequately model the electricity sector’s interactions with
the other economic actors with the help of a computable general equilibrium model (Schäfer and
Jacoby, 2005). Finally, as energy and climate policies in Switzerland involve a wide spectrum of
policy types, an appropriate implementation of both market policies and technological restrictions
is required. We therefore choose to couple a bottom-up electricity supply model with a top-down
computable general equilibrium model (CGE) through soft-link.
An obvious choice would have been to implement the soft-coupling methodology put forward by
Böhringer and Rutherford (2009) with large scale models, as has been done by Rausch and Mowers
(2014). However, this technique involves the implementation of a linear price-responsive demand
function in the bottom-up model that is re-benchmarked at each iteration on a Marshallian demand
approximation of the CGE model demand curve. This was not possible in our case for reasons of
project organization1. The electricity supply model - CROSSTEM-CH - is based on the TIMES
framework (Loulou et al., 2005). Electricity demand is a ﬁxed exogenous input in the CROSSTEM-
1See section 1.4 p. 7
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CH model, which minimizes total system cost2. Although the TIMES framework allows for the
introduction of elastic demand functions, calibrated from a reference run and given constant own-
price elasticities (Loulou et al., 2005), this is a delicate task for which our partners did not have
the resources within this project. We therefore developed an alternative soft-link coupling method
which can be implemented in cases where a linear demand function cannot be introduced in the
bottom-up model.
1.2 Objectives
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the interplay between the electricity market and the
economy in changing policy environments. We use Switzerland as a case study. Switzerland is an
interesting case, as many aspects of energy and climate policy are under discussion and undergoing
changes. Many of those concern electricity due to the decision - following the Fukushima disaster
- to phase-out nuclear power which represents close to 40% of electricity supply.
In Switzerland, both the nature of climate and energy policies, and the liberalization of the electricity
market are under discussion. Whether or not - and indeed when - the electricity market will be fully
liberalized is an additional unknown in an already complex and undetermined situation. Gaining an
understanding on the link between market liberalization and the eﬀectiveness of policies might help
design adequate policies despite - and in provision for - the uncertainty related to the state of the
market.
Market liberalization changes the way wholesale electricity is priced. Typically, under regulation,
prices are set to allow producers to cover their generation costs and achieve an acceptable proﬁt.
In a fully liberalized competitive market, wholesale electricity is priced at short-term marginal cost,
which does not include ﬁxed costs. This provides no incentive for investment unless there is scarcity
of capacity, in which case the wholesale price includes a scarcity rent3, which, in equilibrium, provides
incentive for investment into new capacities (International Energy Agency, 2001).
With the exception of Lanz and Rausch (2016) – who speciﬁcally diﬀerentiate utilities trading on
regulated or free markets – assumptions on market regime are rarely discussed in coupled top-down
bottom-up analyses. In energy systems model like MARKAL/TIMES that implement own-price
elastic demand, the price of the energy good is the marginal cost of its process, which includes
all constraints and costs (incl. ﬁxed costs). They therefore implicitly assume a liberalized market
that takes into account scarcity rents. Amongst the studies that explicitly link costs from bottom-
up models to prices in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, diﬀerent assumptions are
made: some link energy prices to average costs (Fortes et al., 2014), while others link it to long-
term marginal costs (Martinsen, 2011; Riekkola et al., 2013; Rausch and Mowers, 2014). These
diﬀerent ways of linking generation costs and prices imply diﬀerent assumptions on the market’s
institutional framework. However, this is something that is rarely discussed.
To the best of our knowledge, whether climate and energy policy assessment by coupled top-down
bottom-up models is robust to electricity markets’ regime has not been addressed in the literature.
2In contrast with maximizing total surplus with an elastic demand.
3On the marginal technology as well.
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In this work, we endeavor to investigate whether assumptions on market regime - and hence the
link between wholesale electricity prices (top-down) and generation costs (bottom-up) - have an
impact on modeling results.
The Energy Perspectives 2050 (Prognos, 2012), commissioned by the Federal Oﬃce of Energy,
outline three electricity supply options to answer electricity demands taking nuclear phase-out into
account: (1) gas-ﬁred power plants, (2) gas-ﬁred power plants and renewables, and (3) renewables
with the help of electricity imports.
It is yet unsure whether one of these scenarios would be politically preferred over the other, or if a
quasi-selection of technologies might arise from climate policies. Currently, the CO2 law stipulates
that fossil thermal power plants will be approved in Switzerland only if they fully compensate their
CO2 emissions. Additionally, at least 50% of their compensation performance must be rendered
domestically. This strong regulation is quite prohibitive and keeps Swiss ﬁrms from investing into
gas-ﬁred power plants in Switzerland. For gas power plants to be built in Switzerland, the domestic
compensation clause would have to be relaxed, or speciﬁc compensation projects setups.
While considering the manifold motivations for political inﬂuence on technology selection, it is
crucial to investigate the costs and impacts of such restrictions. Following the methodological
considerations of the previous section, we examine the social cost of a particular type of technology
restriction (banning the use of natural gas in electricity generation). Especially, we investigate
whether and how a coupled top-down bottom-up framework provides additional value to the analysis,
compared to a pure bottom-up view which would mostly be based on the observation of changes
in total system cost.
1.3 Thesis outline
In chapter 2, we present the ELECTRA-CH framework, built to analyze electricity markets in
Switzerland. It is composed of the dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the
Swiss economy, GENESwIS and of the dynamic TIMES model of electricity supply CROSSTEM-
CH4. The two models are coupled through an automated iterative soft link (Wene, 1996; Martinsen,
2011; Rausch and Mowers, 2014), which consists of running the models iteratively with selected
input from the other model until convergence is reached on a given criterion. This method permits to
keep the models’ full complexity, while prioritizing the strengths of each model over the weaknesses
of the other.
Chapter 2 shows a few results illustrating the functioning of the ELECTRA-CH modeling frame-
work. Despite the complex structure of the coupled framework, the results can be explained and
policy-induced impacts can be tracked down. On a methodological level, we note that a careful
harmonization of the models is crucial for framework convergence and for producing dependable
results. Also, the variables to be linked between bottom-up and top-down models must be meticu-
lously selected and interpreted in order not to introduce inaccuracies or logic ﬂaws in the framework.
This is particularly the case for the link between bottom-up costs and top-down wholesale electricity
4Developed by the Energy Economics Group from Laboratory for Energy Systems Analysis (LEA) at Paul Scherrer
Institute (PSI).
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prices, which we analyze in chapter 3. Finally, the implementation of a demand dampening method
- here, Gauss-Seidel - is essential for achieving convergence.
The choice of an adequate way of linking bottom-up generation costs with top-down wholesale
electricity price in ELECTRA-CH proved to be challenging. Indeed, market regulations are changing:
Swiss electricity markets are partly liberalized and further liberalization is discussed together with
the integration in the European market. As we cannot predict market evolution precisely, it is
important to understand its impacts on model results.
In chapter 3, we simulate a tightening of climate and energy policies under two diﬀerent mar-
ket evolutions: (1) regulated market, and (2) evolution towards a fully liberalized market. In
the coupling procedure, the link between wholesale electricity prices (top-down) and generation
costs (bottom-up) depends precisely on regulatory market assumptions: In the regulated market,
wholesale electricity prices are "cost-plus", while they depend on marginal generation costs in the
liberalized market. We show that, in Switzerland, an electricity tax is signiﬁcantly more eﬀective
in reducing electricity demand in the liberalized than in the regulated market. This is due to the
fact that marginal cost and average cost do not react in the same way to a reduction in demand.
Although the exact variation of these two types of costs may be diﬀerent under diﬀerent policy
shocks and for diﬀerent generation systems and technology options, the fact that they do not vary
the same way highlights the need to take ongoing and projected market liberalization into account
and disclose pricing assumptions when interpreting models’ results.
Despite market liberalization, technology restrictions are still widely adopted for various motives (e.g.
safety reasons, reducing fuel import dependence, environmental and climate concerns, jobs creation
or preservation, political agendas). Instruments inherited from regulation, technology restrictions
may have diﬀerent impacts on the economy in changing market environments. In chapter 4, we
focus on how to adequately assess the costs and impact of technology restrictions.
Bottom-up models, with their extensive technological details, are often the ﬁrst choice to analyze
the costs of technology restrictions. However, due to their partial-equilibrium nature, they often only
assess direct costs. Top-down models, on the other hand, struggle to model adequately technology
restrictions. In chapter 4, we endeavor to investigate the eﬀect of technology restrictions with the
added insight of combining top-down and bottom-up information in a single framework.
We use the ELECTRA-CH framework to investigate the prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants in
Switzerland. Although new gas-ﬁred power plants may be deemed the cleaner option in countries
with other fossil fuel production, for Switzerland, they represent a large augmentation in CO2
emissions and increased dependance on fuel imports. We analyze two electricity supply options for
Switzerland after nuclear phase-out: (1) a balanced-trade scenario in which Switzerland’s annual
electricity production must be equal to its consumption and (2) a no-gas scenario that forbids
gas-ﬁred power plants, but accepts net electricity imports.
We ﬁnd that, for Switzerland, the prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants and relaxation of trade
constraints have opposite eﬀects on total system cost and marginal cost: average cost is reduced,
while marginal cost increases. In a liberalized market with marginal cost pricing, this means that the
electricity price rises, even though savings are obtained on total system cost, which increases proﬁts.
Total system cost reductions and the wholesale electricity price increase have opposite eﬀects on
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welfare. Hence, welfare increases, but not by the full extent of total system cost reduction. A pure
bottom-up analysis would therefore overestimate the beneﬁts of the policy.
Technology restrictions alter both cost functions and price levels. Situations where marginal cost and
average cost vary in opposite ways are speciﬁc to technology mixes composed of largely depreciated
plants where marginal (new) technologies are relatively expensive. However, in any circumstances
where average cost and marginal cost do not vary exactly in the same way, policy analysis must
take both electricity price and total system cost into consideration.
Finally, with electricity markets being further liberalized, policy induced variations of proﬁt margins
should not be overlooked.
1.4 Scope of the thesis
This work is part of a collaborative project: ELECTRA - Electricity markets and trade in Switzerland
and its neighboring countries: Building a coupled techno-economic modeling framework ﬁnanced by
the research program Energy-Economy-Society of the Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy. Three institu-
tions were involved in the project: the consulting ﬁrm Econability, the Laboratory of Environmental
and Urban Economics (LEURE) at EPFL, and the Energy Economics Group from Laboratory for
Energy Systems Analysis (LEA) at Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI).
This thesis is based on the work that I accomplished within this project. This involved the modi-
ﬁcation and further development of the GENESwIS model, the conception and implementation of
the coupling procedure, as well as the analysis of the coupled results.
The bottom-up model - CROSSTEM-CH - was developed by the Energy Economics Group from
Laboratory for Energy Systems Analysis (LEA) at Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI). Through project
agreements, I had access to the bottom-up source codes - in the form of text ﬁles (I did not have
access to front-end and back-end softwares) - only for running the coupling algorithm.
As I do not have any claim on bottom-up intellectual property, this thesis does not include bottom-up
model descriptions, detailed discussions on bottom-up modeling assumptions, nor speciﬁc bottom-
up results. However, some bottom-up results that are required for the analyses performed appear
in this thesis. It is indeed diﬃcult - and unreasonably uninformative - not to present any bottom-up
results at all in a coupled bottom-up top-down analysis.
For the interested readers who want to know more about the CROSSTEM/CROSSTEM-CH models
and their assumptions, please refer to Pattupara (2016), which covers the bottom-up modeling
within the ELECTRA project and further work involving the CROSSTEM models.
1.5 Structure of the thesis
The body of this thesis is composed of the compilation of three articles.
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Chapter 2 presents ELECTRA-CH: a coupled energy economic modeling framework for analyzing
Swiss electricity markets, which will be made available as a working paper providing a transparent
account of the model and, in particular, the coupling methodology.
Chapter 3 is an amended version of the paper Linking electricity prices and costs in bottom-up
top-down coupling under changing market environments written by Sophie Maire, Frank Vöhringer
and Philippe Thalmann, submitted to The Energy Journal.
Chapter 4 is an amended version of the paper Welfare eﬀects of technology restrictions for electricity
generation, written by Sophie Maire, Frank Vöhringer and Philippe Thalmann, not yet submitted.
To avoid repetitions, the methodology sections of the otherwise self-containing papers composing
chapters 3 and 4 have been cut-out.
Chapter 2
ELECTRA-CH: a coupled energy
economic modeling framework for
analyzing Swiss electricity markets
Abstract
ELECTRA-CH is a coupled top-down bottom-up framework developed to analyze electricity markets
in Switzerland. It is composed of two component models: (1) a dynamic TIMES electricity supply
model, CROSSTEM-CH, and (2) a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the
Swiss economy, GENESwIS. These two models are coupled through an iterative soft link such that
each model keeps its full structure and complexity. The particular strengths of each model are
prioritized and used to inform the other model: The bottom-up model provides the technology
mix and costs of electricity generation, while the top-down model supplies economic feedback,
endogenous prices variations for factors and commodities, and electricity demand variations. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide a transparent account of the coupling methodology.
Keywords: energy modeling; electricity markets; soft-link coupling; top-down general equilibrium
model; bottom-up energy supply model
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2.1 Introduction
Switzerland’s electricity generation is dominated today by hydro and nuclear technologies. However,
following the accident in Fukushima in 2011, the Swiss Government decided not to replace existing
nuclear plants at the end of their safe lifetime with new generation plants. Five nuclear power
plants - in function since 1969 for the oldest and 1984 for the youngest plant - cover nearly 40%
of electricity supply. This, and the fact that Switzerland vouched to reduce its domestic CO2
emissions by 30% from 1990 to 2030, implies that ﬁnding the right set of policies that would meet
both these obligations at low cost, low environmental impact and minimum risk to energy security
is a challenge (International Energy Agency, 2012). This challenge asks for appropriate tools to
analyze electricity markets and their interaction with climate and energy policies.
Climate and energy policy analysis is mostly informed by two modeling approaches: bottom-up and
top-down. Bottom-up models are based on extensive technological detail. Because of their large
computational requirements, these models cannot conjointly include detailed economic feedback.
Top-down models are aggregated, consistent macro-economic frameworks with micro-economic
fundations that simulate the interactions between consumers, producers and the public sector. The
complexity of all these interactions prevents these models from including detailed technological
speciﬁcations. Top-down models are designed to assess market-based policies, but struggle to
incorporate technology-speciﬁc or command-and-control policies adequately.
Combining top-down models with bottom-up models permits to assess both types of policies
(market-based instruments and command & control) and their interactions, which brings new in-
sights into policy analysis. These models strive to incorporate the technological explicitness of
bottom-up models with the micro-economic representation of agents’ behavior in a general equi-
librium of ﬂexible markets provided by top-down models into a single framework (Hourcade et al.,
2006). A lot of eﬀort has been devoted to developing and assessing coupling methods since the ﬁrst
coupling by Hoﬀman and Jorgenson (1977). Two main currents emerged: "hard linking", which
encompasses the two model types into one single model, and "soft linking", which couples existing
full-size models by exchange of variables (Wene, 1996).
The hard linking methodology may be implemented by enhancing one model with a reduced ver-
sion of the other (Manne and Wene, 1992; Messner and Schrattenholzer, 2000; Kombaroglu and
Madlener, 2003; Sue Wing, 2006; Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008), or by writing a hybrid model
directly as a mixed complementary problem (MCP) (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008; Frei et al.,
2003). This methodological choice insures consistency within the model but does not permit a high
level of detail in both technical speciﬁcation and economic interactions.
The "soft link" coupling method (Drouet et al., 2005; Schäfer and Jacoby, 2005; Martinsen, 2011;
Sceia et al., 2012; Riekkola et al., 2013; Fortes et al., 2014) involves keeping the models’ full
structure and complexity, exchanging a chosen set of variables and solving the models iteratively
until convergence is reached on a given criterion. It has the advantage to permit the use of full-scale
models with full dimensionally and complexity. However, Böhringer and Rutherford (2009) warn
of the dangers of inter-model inconsistencies and convergence issues when soft-coupling models
with fundamentally diﬀerent logics. They decompose an MCP hybrid model and solve it iteratively,
proposing a more consistent way of soft-coupling models. This approach inspired implementations
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by Tuladhar et al. (2009), Lanz and Rausch (2011), and Rausch and Mowers (2014), the latter
with full-scale models.
The ELECTRA-CH framework consists of two component models: a TIMES electricity supply
model of Switzerland - CROSSTEM-CH - and a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model - GENESwIS - of the Swiss economy. These two models are coupled through an iterative
soft link. CROSSTEM-CH provides a detailed representation of electricity generation, which is
prioritized over the generic function in GENESwIS. Additionally, endogenous electricity demand
variations as well as factor and intermediate input price variations simulated by GENESwIS are sent
back to CROSSTEM-CH. GENESwIS permits to model market-based policies, while technology
restrictions can be introduced in CROSSTEM-CH.
The choice of a soft-link methodology emerged from the following considerations: As electricity is
a very speciﬁc commodity, a careful and detailed modeling of time-periods, load-curves and techno-
logical potentials is crucial, which requires a detailed energy supply model. Furthermore, electricity
is a commodity which is used by all sectors and households. It is hence necessary to adequately
model the electricity sector’s interactions with the other economic actors with the help of a com-
putable general equilibrium model (Schäfer and Jacoby, 2005). In addition, as energy and climate
policies in Switzerland involve a wide spectrum of policy types, an appropriate implementation of
both market policies and technological restrictions is required. Finally, we want to be able to model
existing tax distortions. Hence, the use of full-size models and the prioritization of their respective
strengths was preferred over full integration.
This chapter is structured in the following way: Section 2.2 shortly introduces the individual models
(GENESwIS and CROSSTEM-CH), while section 2.3 illustrates the way they are coupled. The
purpose of this chapter is to provide a transparent account of the coupling methodology. We
therefore show only a few results as an illustration in section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Models
2.2.1 GENESwIS
GENESwIS is a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Swiss economy de-
signed to analyze energy and environmental policies (Vöhringer, 2012; Maire et al., 2015).
In GENESwIS, agents act rationally and have perfect foresight over the entire time-horizon (2010-
2050). Households maximize their utility under a budget constraint. They earn wages by providing
labor and interest by renting out capital. GENESwIS exhibits ﬂexible labor supply as households can
choose between labor and leisure. As a further element of income, they receive social beneﬁts from
the Government. Households can choose between consuming goods and services, or enjoy leisure
time (see nesting structure ﬁgure 2.1). They optimize their consumption choice between diﬀerent
periods, which determines saving behavior.
Capital is modeled as putty-clay to incorporate the rigid character of investment decisions and
crowding out of investments. Thus, free capital, once invested into one sector (industry, services
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or electricity), cannot be transformed back into capital for another sector. Investments are treated
as solely domestic.
Firms maximize proﬁt under technology constraints and the assumption of perfect competition.
The Government collects taxes (income tax, value added tax, mineral oil tax, CO2 tax) and uses the
revenue for lump-sum transfers (social beneﬁts) and public goods provision. Equal yield is assumed:
the income tax rate is modiﬁed endogenousely to keep public goods provision constant.
Domestic and foreign goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes and are aggregated following
Armington’s description of a small open economy (Armington, 1969).
Non-satiation in consumption implies that demand equals supply in all markets. Relative prices are
adjusted until all markets clear.
GENESwIS’ sectoral disaggregation is designed for the analysis of energy and environmental policies,
with an emphasis on the electricity sector. Accordingly, production technologies specify the use
of energy inputs (see nesting structure in ﬁgure 2.2). Non-energy industries are separated into
aggregates taking into account their possible importance in the formation of capital for the electricity
sector and their aﬃliation to diﬀerent CO2 taxation schemes (emissions trading scheme, CO2 tax).
The sectoral disaggregation is displayed in table 2.1 and the commodities demanded in the model
in table 2.2.
Table 2.1 – GENESwIS’ sectors
Energy Transport Non-Energy
Electricity: Rail Agriculture
- generation Road Cement and concrete
- transport and distribution Air & others Construction
Natural gas Metals
- transport and distribution Other sectors with emissions trading
District heating Rest of industry
Reﬁneries Rest of services
Table 2.2 – GENESwIS’ commodities
Energy Transport Non-Energy
Electricity: Rail Agricultural goods
- wholesale Road Cement and concrete
- retail Air & others Construction
Natural gas Metals
District heat Other commodities with emissions trading
Petrol and Diesel Rest of goods
Light heating oil Rest of services
Crude oil (imported)
Nuclear fuel (imported)
The electricity sector is split into electricity generation and electricity transport and distribution
2.2. MODELS 13
Consumption
Intermediate Inputs
Transport
Public transport
Retail 
electricity
Heat
Natural
Gas
District 
Heating
Heating 
Fuel
Leisure Energy
Air & otherRoad Rail
Retail 
electricity
Construction
(Insulation)
Transport
 fuels
E-mobility
Rest of 
industry
Retail 
electricity
Own transport
Figure 2.1 – Nesting structure of household consumption in the GENESwIS model. Elasticities of
substitutions can be found in Appendix 5.1.
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Figure 2.2 – Nesting structure for GENESwIS’ production functions. Elasticities of substitutions
can be found in Appendix 5.1. Electricity generation, electricity transport and distribution, and rail
transport display diﬀerent structures. They can be found respectively in ﬁgure 2.4 p.18, ﬁgure 2.6
p.27, and in Appendix 5.5 ﬁgure 5.1 p.82.
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to permit the diﬀerentiation between wholesale electricity and retail electricity prices. Wholesale
electricity is either produced by the electricity generation sector or imported. It is demanded by the
electricity transport and distribution sector or exported. Retail electricity, after being transported
and distributed, is demanded for three diﬀerent types of uses (appliances, transport, heating), with
demand-side substitution opportunities represented separately for each of these uses (see ﬁgures
2.1 and 2.2). Thus, electricity used for heating can be substituted only against other heating
commodities, electricity used for appliances is considered as a separate form of energy, and electricity
used for transport1 is a substitute to transport fuels.
GENESwIS is based on the 2005 energy-related disaggregation of the Swiss input-output table by
Nathani et al. (2011) and own calculations for further disaggregation and allocation of tax revenues
(see Appendix 5.2).
2.2.2 CROSSTEM-CH
The Cross Border TIMES Electricity Model - CROSSTEM - is a technology-rich dynamic bottom-
up optimization model of the electricity system in Switzerland and its four neighboring countries
developed on the basis of the TIMES framework. TIMES (Loulou et al., 2005) is a perfect foresight
model that, given a comprehensive set of technologies, allows users to minimize the cost of the
technology mix over the time horizon, matching a given demand (inelastic and exogenous) and
taking into account a set of constraints. It displays a high level of technological detail including
operational and maintenance costs, investment costs, fuel costs, lifetime, construction time, renew-
able potential and decommissioning. CROSSTEM (Pattupara and Kannan, 2016) was developed
from the existing STEM-E model described in Kannan and Turton (2011). CROSSTEM’s time
slices are disaggregated to take into account the variability of electricity demand across the day
(hourly), diﬀerent types of day (weekday, Saturday, Sunday) and seasons. For the ELECTRA-CH
framework, we use the Swiss module of the CROSSTEM model - CROSSTEM-CH -, in which
trade with the neighboring countries is exogenous (i.e. electricity import and export prices are set
exogenously). Further details on the CROSSTEM-CH model can be found in (Pattupara, 2016).
2.3 Coupling methodology
GENESwIS and CROSSTEM-CH are coupled through an automated iterative soft link. Coupling
through soft link involves keeping the models’ integrity while prioritizing the strengths of each
model to compensate for the shortcomings of the other. Each model is solved iteratively with input
information from the other model until convergence is reached on a given criterion. In the case
of ELECTRA-CH, the electricity generation production function in the CGE model is determined
by the cost structure optimized by the bottom-up model, while the sectoral electricity demand
variations that occur in the CGE as a result of changes in prices, as well as factor and intermediate
1Electro-mobility is modeled as a sub-nest in transport (see ﬁgures 2.1 and 2.2), where it can be substituted
with transport fuels through an elasticity of substitution of 10. This very high elasticity of substitution was chosen
for calibration purposes due to the very small current share of electro-mobility and high penetration projections by
Prognos (2012).
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input price variations are sent back as input to the bottom-up model.
Figure 2.3 depicts the exchange of information between the two models. Electricity generation
costs and their components as well as export revenues and import costs are extracted from the
CROSSTEM-CH model and translated for the CGE model into a) the wholesale electricity price
and b) input shares for factors and commodities to the electricity generation cost function. The
sectoral electricity demand quantities simulated by the GENESwIS model are then sent back to
become inputs to the CROSSTEM-CH model. To account for price and cost relevant changes
in the economy, factor and intermediate input prices from GENESwIS are used to modify the
investment costs and operation and maintenance costs of the diﬀerent technologies in the bottom-
up model. This sequence is iterated upon until the vector of quantities of total yearly electricity
demands converges.
We start the iteration procedure by running the bottom-up model CROSSTEM-CH with baseline
electricity demand projections from Prognos (2012) as exogenous input.
2.3.1 CROSSTEM-CH inputs into GENESwIS
In ELECTRA-CH, the purpose of the bottom-up model CROSSTEM-CH is to provide a detailed
representation of electricity generation. This detailed representation should, through soft-coupling,
be prioritized over the generic representation of electricity generation of the CGE model. Hence,
the following outputs of the bottom-up model:
• technology mix in electricity generation,
• costs of electricity generation, and
• electricity trade
should enter the CGE model’s electricity generation production function and drive its iterative
modiﬁcation.
CGE models do not encompass the large amount of diﬀerent technologies inherent to bottom-up
models. Hence, the electricity mix cannot be plugged-in as such in GENESwIS. For bottom-up
outputs to be prioritized over the usual structure of the GENESwIS model, they must be translated
into information that can be used by the latter. Furthermore, the GENESwIS model must be mod-
iﬁed such that this information can be treated as direct input without being subject to endogenous
modiﬁcations within one iteration. Additionally, although generation costs can be inserted into the
model, the question of how to link them to wholesale electricity prices is an issue.
In the following sub-sections, we describe the mechanisms involved in translating technology mix and
costs optimized by the bottom-up model into electricity generation production function technology
and wholesale electricity price for the CGE model.
2.3. COUPLING METHODOLOGY 17
electricity generation costs
CROSSTEM-CH GENESwIS
•average 
•marginal 
electricity export revenues
& import cost
input shares to electricity generation
wholesale electricity price
sectoral electricity demands
factors & intermediate input 
prices
changes to investment costs and 
operation & maintenance costs 
for electricity generation
Figure 2.3 – Information exchange between the two component models within one iteration.
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Technology mix
In a CGE model, input shares to constant elasticities of substitution (CES) production functions
deﬁne the technology of production. For electricity generation, this cannot be seen as "technology
mix", as no diﬀerentiation is made between the diﬀerent bottom-up technologies (i.e., solar pv,
storage hydro, oﬀshore wind, ...). Nevertheless, it gives the ratio of diﬀerent commodities needed
in average to produce a unit of electricity (amount of machinery, operation and maintenance, gas,
nuclear fuel,...). A change in technology mix, say the introduction of gas-ﬁred power plants, will be
felt in the CGE model mainly through an increase of the share of gas, and maybe a shift in shares
of capital and operation and maintenance costs.
The bottom up technology mix must then be translated into CGE technology: the diﬀerent costs
of electricity production calculated by the bottom-up model are aggregated into inputs from com-
modities deﬁned in the CGE model, speciﬁcally natural gas costs, nuclear fuel costs, capital costs,
operation and maintenance costs, inter-connector costs, import costs and export revenues. These
cost share are then introduced in the electricity generation production function of the CGE to
specify the production technology.
Electricity generation
Domestic usesExports
 0
0
GENESwIS’ shares
0
Operation & 
Maintenance
GAS NUC Capital Imports Inter -
connectors
0
Electricity transport 
and distribution
Foreign exchange
Figure 2.4 – Nesting structure of GENESwIS’ electricity generation production function. The labels
in bold-green represent inputs from the CROSSTEM-CH model.
For this information to be treated as direct input, the electricity generation production function in
GENESwIS is set as a Leontief function (i.e.. with elasticity of substitution zero). Its cost function
can then be written as:
CELE(P, Y, t) = YELE(t) ·
∑
i
q˜i(t) · Pi(t) (2.1)
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where YELE(t) is the activity index variable of the electricity generation production function at
period t, and Pi(t) the price variables and q˜i(t) the quantity parameters of the diﬀerent inputs i
entering electricity generation. This way, no substitution is allowed - within one model run - between
inputs, which are set as ﬁxed shares. The electricity generation production function’s technology
in GENESwIS is thus determined by CROSSTEM-CH’s cost shares at each iteration. The nesting
structure of the production function for electricity generation is represented in ﬁgure 2.4.
Operation and maintenance costs are aggregated in the CROSSTEM-CH model. To retain sectoral
information in GENESwIS, we preserve the shares speciﬁed in the Swiss input-ouptut table (Nathani
et al., 2011). Inter-connectors (international transportation lines) are assumed to be owned partly
by the Swiss electricity transport and distribution sector and by the trading neighboring country
(50% - 50%). Inter-connector costs are hence paid to electricity transport and distribution and to
foreign exchange (see ﬁgure 2.4).
Electricity transport and distribution is not coupled to the CROSSTEM-CH model, as the latter
does not precisely represent transport and distribution costs within the country of production.
Investment
CROSSTEM-CH optimizes investment decisions for electricity generation. Investments costs per
technology are disaggregated into ﬁnite lifetime annuities2. In the coupled framework, the yearly
sum of those annuities determines the yearly capital input in GENESwIS’ electricity generation
production function (see ﬁgure 2.4). GENESwIS simulates investment decisions, and hence capital
accumulation which satisfy the demand for capital in the electricity sector set by CROSSTEM-CH.
In GENESwIS, Capital is modeled as putty-clay. Thus, capital, once it is invested into one sector
(industry, services or electricity), cannot be transformed into capital for another sector. Investment
in the electricity sector therefore aﬀects investment and capital formation for the other sectors
(industry and services) through crowding-out (resp. crowding-in) eﬀects.
Both CROSSTEM-CH and GENESwIS are fully dynamic models (with perfect foresight), which
implies an inﬁnite time-horizon. However, applied models can only compute a ﬁnite number of time
periods. They therefore need to overcome investment issues that rises from a ﬁnite horizon.
In TIMES models - like the CROSSTEM-CH model - the objective function is corrected such that
investing towards the end of the modeling horizon is not decremental. A salvage value is calculated
to take into account the cost of investments and decommissioning for technologies that have a
technical lifetime lasting longer than the last modeling period. This salvage value is credited back to
the objective function. An identical correction to the objective function is implemented for material
and energy that are embedded in processes that do not ﬁnish by the end of the horizon (Loulou
2In GENESwIS, which is a fully dynamic Ramsey model, annuities are discounted with a ﬁxed rate. To avoid
inconsistencies in the deﬁnition of annuities within the coupled framework, we endeavored to introduce a ﬁnite-
lifetime (vintage-based) treatment of annuities in GENESwIS. This new treatment of investments necessited to
extract from the bottom-up model annuities generated by investments that occurred prior to the ﬁrst modeling
period (the calibration period in CROSSTEM-CH). However, the CROSSTEM-CH model considers prior investments
as sunk costs that don’t enter the cost optimization. They are therefore not speciﬁcally modeled. Instead of taking
assumptions on prior investments, we decided to keep the structure of capital accumulation in GENESwIS unchanged
and be aware of the potential consistency issue in the deﬁnition of annuities.
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et al., 2005).
In applied dynamic CGE models, it crucial to introduce a terminal capital constraint in the last
period to approximate an inﬁnite horizon behavior. Without terminal constraint, households would
not invest in the last period and all capital would be used. For this purpose, we introduce in
GENESwIS the constraint proposed by Lau et al. (2002) which requires investment to grow at the
same rate as output in the last period:
IT
IT−1
=
YT
YT−1
(2.2)
with IT investment and YT total output in the last period.
Both models are run with time horizon set in 2070, while scenario analyses stop in 2050. Thus,
terminal conditions and border eﬀects do not have a strong incidence on the results.
Wholesale electricity price
The electricity generation technology is determined by CROSSTEM-CH’s input cost shares. For
the wholesale electricity price, things are more complex. As prices cannot be ﬁxed in a CGE model,
the wholesale electricity price cannot be plugged directly into the model. However, prices in the
CGE can be pushed to a given value by varying the inputs of the production function while keeping
output constant. In the following, we describe the way inputs’ levels are determined in order to
keep the production technology while setting the wholesale electricity price to the right value.
The zero proﬁt condition3 for electricity generation, assuming the cost function eq.(2.1), can be
written as:
PELE(t) · qELE(t) · YELE(t) = YELE(t) ·
∑
i
q˜i(t) · Pi(t) (2.3)
where PELE(t) is the price variable of wholesale electricity in period t, YELE(t) the activity index
variable of the electricity generation production function, Pi(t) the price variables of the diﬀerent
inputs i , and qELE(t) and q˜i(t) the quantity parameters for respectively electricity generation and
the diﬀerent inputs needed for electricity production (see table 2.3). We assume benchmark prices
to be set to one, which allows us to treat the quantity parameters as values.
With output quantity parameter of electricity generation qELE(t) constant (set at benchmark value
and not modiﬁed through the coupling algorythm), eq.(2.3) implies that a variation of q˜i(t) impacts
the electricity price PELE(t). The goal of the exercise is therefore to calculate the q˜i(t) parame-
ters, given CROSSTEM-CH’s costs c˜i(t), such that the q˜i(t) push the wholesale electricity price,
PELE(t), to reﬂect CROSSTEM-CH’s total costs divided by the electricity demand. Accordingly,
we want:
PELE(t) =
∑
i c˜i(t)
YELE(t) · qELE(t) (2.4)
3We omit tax distortions and inequalities in this explanation for ease of notation.
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Table 2.3 – Deﬁnition of variables and parameters
Variables
YELE(t) Activity index for electricity generation at period t
PELE(t) Price of wholesale electricity at period t
Pi(t) Price of commodity i at period t
Parameters
qELE(t) quantity of electricity generation (benchmark value)
q˜i(t) quantity of input i needed for electricity generation
(determined from CROSSTEM-CH’s outputs)
c˜i(t) cost of commodity i to electricity generation (CROSSTEM-CH’s outputs)
pi ,k−1(t) equilibrium price of commodity i at the previous iteration
yELE,k−1(t) equilibrium activity index of electricity generation at the previous iteration
Therefore, from (2.3), we obtain that input quantities q˜i(t) must be calculated such that:
q˜i(t) =
c˜i(t)
Pi(t) · YELE(t) . (2.5)
However, all price and quantity indices constantly vary in the GENESwIS model within one model
run. It is therefore not possible to determine the q˜i(t) within GENESwIS using current prices and
indices. To circumvent this issue, input quantity parameters q˜i(t) can be calculated using input
prices Pi(t) and electricity activity index YELE(t) from the GENESwIS run of the previous iteration.
Eq.(2.5) becomes:
q˜i(t) =
c˜i(t)
pi ,k−1(t) · yELE,k−1(t) (2.6)
for iteration k . Although previous iteration prices might diﬀer from present prices, once the frame-
work converges, input prices converge as well. Likewise, as the convergence criterion is set on
electricity demand, the electricity production index YELE(t) is bound to have converged as demand
always equals supply in a CGE model.
By calculating input quantities this way, the wholesale electricity price PELE(t) reﬂects the average
cost of the CROSSTEM-CH model. This is ﬁne when assuming a regulated wholesale electricity
market. However, the Swiss wholesale electricity market is already partly liberalized and is expected
to be liberalized further in the coming years. In a liberalized market, prices are set at marginal cost
level and not at average cost level.
As investigated in chapter 3, assumptions on electricity market liberalization aﬀect the eﬀectiveness4
energy policies.
Currently, Swiss electricity markets are partly liberalized. An independent regulatory authority -
the Federal Electricity Commission (ElCom) - is responsible for monitoring and supervising the
liberalization of the market. The transmission grid has been separated and is under the control of
the publicly owned ﬁrm Swissgrid. More than six hundred players take part in the Swiss wholesale
electricity market, including about 80 power producers of varying importance. The majority of those
4An electricity tax is more eﬀective in reducing demand in a liberalized market than under regulation.
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players are publicly owned by municipalities and cantons. They trade on energy only (Day-ahead and
Intraday) and reserve markets. In Switzerland, no future market is setup and such transactions take
the form of bilateral contracts (Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy, 2013b). Large consumers (annual
consumption > 100 MWh), representing approximately half of the Swiss electricity demand, can
choose their supplier and decide to pay market prices instead of regulated tariﬀs. Full market
liberalization has been postponed and will depend on the advancement of the legislative work on
the Energy Strategy 2050, the situation of the electricity market, and the negotiations with the
European Union regarding the full integration of the Swiss electricity market into the European
electricity market, which are still ongoing.
Although we do not know exactly how wholesale electricity markets will develop, assuming a fully
regulated market would be misguided. For this study, we assume a progressive evolution to a
liberalized electricity market, where prices increasingly reﬂect long-term marginal cost. By "long-
term marginal cost", we mean marginal cost including a portion of ﬁxed cost. Indeed, CROSSTEM-
CH minimizes the total cost of electricity generation and trade over the full period 2010 to 2050.
The marginal cost calculated by the CROSSTEM-CH model is the shadow price of the commodity
balance at a given time, and represents the increase in total system cost due to an increase of a
unit of demand (Loulou et al., 2005). It includes all constraints and costs (incl. ﬁxed costs) and
can therefore be seen as a long-term marginal cost, or marginal cost including scarcity rents. As
the CGE model’s simulates a year and not each of the 288 time-slices displayed in the bottom-up
model, CROSSTEM-CH’s marginal cost is converted to an annual demand-weighted marginal cost
(MC):
MC =
∑
τ Dτ ·MCτ∑
τ Dτ
(2.7)
where Dτ and MCτ are the demand and marginal cost at time-slice τ .
The use of long-term marginal cost as wholesale price implies that scarcity rents are taken into
account (i.e. utilities recover their ﬁxed costs). We assume that the market is fully liberalized
and the market price equals the long-term marginal cost of the CROSSTEM-CH model from 2025
onwards; in 2010, the price is given by input-output table data, while in the years in between, the
market is gradually liberalized and prices reﬂect a combination of regulated prices and marginal cost
pricing (see ﬁgure 2.5).
For the price in GENESwIS to reﬂect the wholesale electricity market price, a markup5 is set on
average cost. The markup is calculated in such a way that the price of wholesale electricity is pushed
from the average cost AC given by the CROSSTEM-CH model to the assumed market price6 Pm
as per equation (2.8). The proﬁt is redistributed lump-sum to the representative household.
Proﬁt markup(t) =
Pm(t)− AC(t)
AC(t)
(2.8)
In GENESwIS, all sectors display constant returns to scale. This is the common assumption in
5This markup is a markup over average cost, allowing the model to reach marginal cost levels in a perfect
competition setting. It is not to be mistaken with a markup over marginal cost as is usually deﬁned in cases of
imperfect competition.
6The assumptions on market liberalization illustrated in ﬁgure 2.5 translate into: Pm(2010) = IOT price,
Pm(2015) =
2
3
AC(2015) + 1
3
MC(2015), Pm(2020) = 13AC(2020) +
2
3
MC(2020), and Pm(t ≥ 2025) = MC(t).
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Figure 2.5 – Market liberalization assumptions: wholesale electricity market price in comparison
with baseline annual average and marginal costs from the CROSSTEM-CH model.
computational equilibrium models that do not explicitly model imperfect competition. Diminishing
returns to scale is eﬀectively introduced in GENESwIS’ electricity generation production function
through the coupling of the models: the proﬁt introduced in the CGE model is equal to the producer
surplus from the bottom-up model. This way, the model takes into account sub-marginal rents and
income eﬀects from binding constraints in the bottom-up. We do not, however, model imperfect
competition, but marginal cost pricing in liberalized markets.
The Swiss electricity market may be imperfectly competitive. However, with the increased exchange
with the European market, the expansion of renewable production and the vertical disintegration
of generation, transport and distribution, strong market power is unlikely. Moreover, market inef-
ﬁciencies such as imperfect competition cannot be modeled in optimization frameworks, as these
models impose eﬃcient allocation (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2009). In the presence of imperfect
competition, the player exercising market power decides to modify its production in order to inﬂu-
ence the market price. This is not a behavior that can be modeled - or even approximated - in the
CROSSTEM-CH model. Introducing imperfect competition in the CGE model would thus bring
consistency issues between the two models. We therefore decided not to introduce an endogenous
formulation of imperfect competition in the coupled framework.
Although we determine, at each iteration, the value of the input quantity parameters and the proﬁt
markup rate to push the wholesale electricity price to market price level, the wholesale electricity
price is endogenous in GENESwIS. It is determined by supply and demand through an appropriate
market clearing condition: The GENESwIS model simulates a coherent equilibrium. The wholesale
electricity price determined by GENESwIS in the earliest iterations might diﬀer from the market price
calculated from CROSSTEM-CH’s costs. However, when the framework approaches convergence,
the wholesale electricity price aligns to the market price (see ﬁgure 2.9 p.31).
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2.3.2 GENESwIS inputs into CROSSTEM-CH
The CGE model, GENESwIS, simulates the reactions of the economy to the policies implemented
and to the changes in electricity generation technology and wholesale electricity price provided by
the bottom-up model. We include these reactions, namely endogenous electricity demand variations
and factor and commodity prices variations, into the bottom-up model.
Electricity demands
In CROSSTEM-CH, electricity demands are set exogenously. At each iteration, yearly sectoral
electricity demands are extracted from GENESwIS and given as inputs to the CROSSTEM-CH
model. GENESwIS’ yearly electricity demands7 are converted into demands for each of the 288
time-slices of the CROSSTEM-CH model through load curves.
To help with convergence, the electricity demand response of the GENESwIS model is not sent
directly, but dampened (see section 2.3.3).
Factor and input prices variation
Fuel costs are set exogenously for both models as Switzerland does not have an impact on world
prices. However, general equilibrium variations of domestic prices should be taken into account for
the other bottom-up aggregated input costs, namely investments, and operation and maintenance
(O&M) costs.
To do so, we create price-variation coeﬃcients for each technology8. These coeﬃcients are com-
posed of the weighted average of the price variation of each factor and commodities; the weighting
being equal to the share of expenditure.
The decomposition of investment costs is based mostly on Ragwitz et al. (2009). The price
variation coeﬃcients are calculated as the weighted average (weights given in table 2.4) of the
price variation of each input compared to the benchmark prices. In GENESwIS, transport sectors
are disaggregated between road, rail, and air and other transport. The transport price coeﬃcient
is therefore composed of a combination of the diﬀerent transport sectors prices using Swiss input-
output table shares of intermediate consumption of transportation by the electricity generation
sector.
Operation and maintenance costs include labor, material and other service costs. Labor shares were
estimated by Hal Turton for an analysis in the EU-NEEDS project. The other sectors’ shares are
computed from the Swiss input-output table (Nathani et al., 2011). As transport is considered here
only for thermal plants, it is considered to be composed solely of pipeline transport (included in air
7Electricity demands for 2010 are not exchanged. Due to the calibration of the baseline to Prognos (2012)
projections and to the inter-temporal nature of the CGE model, some undesirable border eﬀects appear in 2010. It
is hence not instructive to couple 2010 values, which are anyways historical values.
8We class the diﬀerent production technologies into four main groups: hydro generation, thermal generation,
solar photovoltaics, and other renewable technologies.
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and other transport). The price-variation coeﬃcients’ weights for operation and maintenance are
given in table 2.5.
Table 2.4 – Composition of the price variation coeﬃcients modifying CROSSTEM-CH’s investments
costs per technology.
ETS Metals Constru Other Trans Other
goods -ction goods -port services
Thermal plants 1% 9% 10% 61% 13% 7%
Hydro plants 0% 5% 27% 45% 4% 19%
Solar PV 16% 30% 1% 42% 9% 2%
Other renewables 0% 24% 12% 56% 3% 4%
Table 2.5 – Composition of the price variation coeﬃcients modifying CROSSTEM-CH’s operation
and maintenance costs per technology.
Labor Metals Constru ETS Other Trans Other
-ction goods goods -port services
Thermal plants 10% 0% 3% 0% 47% 2% 38%
Hydro 80% 1% 3% 0% 2% 0% 13%
Solar PV 50% 2% 11% 1% 7% 0% 28%
Other renewables 50% 2% 11% 1% 7% 0% 28%
2.3.3 Harmonization and convergence
The ﬁrst main challenge when soft-coupling two models of diﬀerent natures such as GENESwIS and
CROSSTEM-CH is for the models to react in a reasonable and stable way to the coupling. Indeed,
input values that vary too much from the values the models are used to receive can lead to solution
problems. For example, a too high electricity demand might push the CROSSTEM-CH model to
reach boundaries of production potentials. It then must use stop-gap production technologies with
very high costs that prevent the model from crashing due to an infeasible solution. These very high
costs, when sent to the GENESwIS model, will bring the electricity demand down drastically. When
sent back to CROSSTEM-CH, a very low demand might, for example, result in CROSSTEM-CH
generating negative costs due to trade revenues. Negative costs are not allowed in the GENESwIS
model, and solving the framework becomes impossible.
Hence, a careful harmonization of the models is necessary before attempting the coupling (see
below).
The second main challenge is to reach convergence. First of all, a solution must exist for the frame-
work to converge to. CGE models are built on CES functions to ensure convexity and solvability. It
is not possible to determine the solution space of the combination of two big models with diﬀerent
structures and logic. We can, however, convince ourselves that, as marginal cost and electricity
demand react in opposed ways, a solution should exist.
When solutions do exist for the scenario simulated, the framework must converge to the existing
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solution. Convergence is not easy to achieve due to the stepwise behavior of the bottom-up model.
Special solving techniques had to be applied in the coupling procedure to avoid the framework
getting locked in oscillations (see below).
Harmonization of the models
Variables that exist in both models should have the same values. For this, the models must be
harmonized.
For exogenous data, harmonization is trivial. Both models use a discount rate of 4.5% and identical
world energy prices (import prices) and CO2 permit prices for the Emissions Trading Scheme (see
table 2.6).
Table 2.6 – World energy prices [CHF2010/GJ] (International Energy Agency, 2010), and CO2
permit prices [CHF2010/ton] for sectors that belong to the emissions trading scheme (Prognos,
2012).
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Crude oil 12.26 15.60 17.08 18.12 18.98 19.50 19.90 20.30 20.65
Gas 8.54 10.61 11.61 12.31 12.91 13.31 13.48 13.74 13.96
CO2 15.58 27.53 39.48 43.63 47.79 51.95 55.06 56.62 58.18
Endogenous variables are much more diﬃcult to harmonize while keeping the structure and data
consistency of both models. For the models to behave smoothly, both electricity generation costs
and demands must be compatible.
GENESwIS is based on the Swiss input-output table (Nathani et al., 2011), which also includes
information on energy prices. It is important to ensure that average and marginal costs of electricity
from the CROSSTEM-CH model (in terms of annual averages) are reconciled with input-output
table prices. Also, to ensure economic consistency, average annual marginal cost generated by
CROSSTEM-CH should not be smaller than annual average cost in any given year. For this purpose,
some input data in the CROSSTEM-CH model were modiﬁed. Especially, capital costs for existing
plants were included in generation costs9.
The baseline scenario for this study is based on the "weiter wie bisher" (business as usual) scenario of
the Swiss Energy Perspectives (Prognos, 2012). CROSSTEM-CH initial demands are exogenously
set on demand projections by Prognos (2012). For the full framework to reproduce this given
baseline scenario, GENESwIS is re-calibrated10 along the baseline demand path, taking into account
inputs from CROSSTEM-CH.
9The fact that bottom-up prices for the ﬁrst modeling years do not include all costs is also pointed out by Glynn
et al. (2015).
10By modifying autonomous energy eﬃciency indices.
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Supply elasticity in GENESwIS
The seminal soft-linking method by Böhringer and Rutherford (2009) introduces ﬂexibility11 in the
coupling algorithm by locally calibrating a linear price-responsive demand function in the bottom-up
model that is re-benchmarked at each iteration on a Marshallian demand approximation of the CGE
model demand curve. This was not possible in our situation, because demand is a ﬁxed exogenous
input to the CROSSTEM-CH model. The TIMES framework allows for the introduction of elastic
demand functions, calibrated from a reference run and given constant own-price elasticities (Loulou
et al., 2005). However, this is a delicate task and our partners12 did not have the resources to
implement it.
Alternatively, to help with the convergence of the models, we introduce a supply elasticity in the
electricity transport and distribution sector of GENESwIS. To set a given supply elasticity for the
electricity transport and distribution sector, we insert a ﬁxed resource at the top of its nest (see
ﬁgure 2.6). The elasticity of substitution σ between the ﬁxed resource and the rest of the inputs
is calculated as per eq.(2.9), given a supply elasticity η and the share of ﬁxed resource θR (see
Rutherford, 1998).
σ = η
θR
1− θR (2.9)
The value of the supply elasticity, η, can be set such that it helps with convergence (approximating
the bottom-up supply elasticity). Lanz and Rausch (2011) - implementing the Böhringer and
Rutherford (2009) decomposition technique - show that the choice of demand elasticity does not
aﬀect the results but that a good approximation of the top-down demand response reduces the
number of iterations needed for convergence. For these simulations, we use a supply elasticity of
η = 2. With θR = 0.024, eq.(2.9) yields an elasticity of substitution of σ = 0.05.
Output of 
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and Distribution 
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All other inputs
0
Figure 2.6 – Nesting structure of the electricity transport and distribution production function in
GENESwIS.
11And the natural interpretation that the bottom-up model solves - in each iteration - a partial equilibrium problem
for the energy sector, maximizing total surplus (the sum of producer and consumer surplus).
12This thesis work is part of a collaborative project. I did not have access and the right to modify the bottom-up
model code.
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Dampening of the demand response
Due to the stepwise nature of the bottom-up supply curve, and despite the introduction of a supply
elasticity for the electricity transport and distribution of the CGE model, it is frequent that the
models locks up into an oscillation between two diﬀerent marginal costs. The resulting electricity
demand hence oscillates between two values and does not converge. To reduce this problem, we
introduce a dampening of the demand response between sub-sequent iterations into the coupler.
Instead of sending the sectoral demands from the CGE directly to the bottom-up model, we send
a Gauss-Seidel (Labriet et al., 2010; Hageman and Young, 1981) combination of the previous
demands.
Figure 2.7 – Illustration of demand-dampening (Gauss-Seidel) for a bottom-up-top-down coupled
framework.
Let Dk be the demand estimated by the CGE model at iteration k . The demand D
′
k , introduced in
CROSSTEM-CH is determined such that:
D
′
k = αDk + (1− α)D
′
k−1 (2.10)
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The calibration of the α parameter is critical. Taking too small steps increases the run time, when
too large steps will not solve the oscillations’ issue. We found that α=0.3 is a good choice for our
framework.
Figure 2.7 gives an illustration of the demand-dampening (Gauss-Seidel method) for our framework.
The representation is merely an illustration, because the depicted supply and demand curves are
much too simplistic.
Let us assume a bottom-up step-wise supply function and a demand curve for the CGE model.
The equilibrium solution lies at demand D∗. The coupling framework’s goal is to converge to this
solution. Let us start with an initial demand D0. The bottom-up model optimizes the electricity
supply system and provides the CGE model with a given marginal cost (wholesale electricity price).
With this information, the CGE model reaches equilibrium at demand D1. D1 is then sent to
the bottom-up model. With D1 for input, a much lower marginal cost is reached, which, sent
to the CGE, will bring a solution at D2. This routine is performed until convergence is reached.
However, with this conﬁguration, the framework never converges. It stays stuck, oscillating between
2 solutions (D3 and D4) indeﬁnitely. This is when the Gauss-Seidel method becomes useful. Let
us start with the same initial demand D0. The demand sent to the bottom-up model (D
′
1, in red
ink in ﬁgure 2.7) is a combination of the previous demands as per eq.(2.10). The same dampening
is applied to the next demands. This way, the steps are reduced, and the framework does not get
stuck oscillating between two states. It is hence able to converge towards the solution D∗.
The demand-dampening approach does not create artiﬁcial equilibria, but merely helps to approach
the solution in a smoother way.
Convergence criterion
The coupling procedure iterates until the electricity demand converges. To test this convergence,
the following criterion ζ is introduced:
ζ =
√∑
t(Dt,k −Dt,k−1)2√∑
t D
2
t,k
≤ z (2.11)
where Dt,k is total electricity demand at period t for iteration k .
The framework stops iterating when the stopping criterion ζ goes below a given precision parameter
z . We verify post-simulation that convergence has also been reached for other variables (marginal
cost, average cost, sectoral output etc.).
2.4 Some illustrative simulations
We present some simulations that aim at testing the functioning of the ELECTRA-CH framework
and illustrating its capacities. For this purpose, we model a ﬁctional but plausible scenario of
strengthened energy and climate policies in Switzerland and compare it to a baseline. It will allow
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us to test for convergence. It will also show how changes in prices, quantities, technologies or
welfare, can not only be estimated, but explained, providing insights into the transmission of policy
shocks.
2.4.1 Scenarios
The baseline scenario is based on the ’weiter wie bisher’ scenario of the Energy Perspectives (Prog-
nos, 2012). It includes the following policies:
• Nuclear power plants are phased-out at the end of their assumed lifetime (50 years) and
not replaced by new generation plants. Eﬀectively, no electricity is produced with nuclear
technology after 2035.
• Electricity trade is constrained such that Switzerland may not import more than it exports on
a yearly average (in quantity terms [PJ]; the model is left to optimize trade revenue).
• An Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is implemented such that CO2-intensive sectors can
compensate their emissions. The Emissions Trading Scheme is linked to the European ETS.
We assume that Switzerland does not have an eﬀect on CO2 prices. CO2 permit prices are
hence exogenously set on projections by Prognos (2012) - see table 2.6, p. 26.
• A tax on CO2 emissions is set on the consumption of natural gas and heating fuels by
households and sectors that do not participate in the ETS. Tax rates are set at 36 CHF/t in
2010, 60 CHF/t in 2015 and at 72 CHF/t from 2020 to 2050.
• 280 mio CHF/year from CO2-tax revenues are recycled through a subsidy program for energy-
eﬃcient refurbishment of buildings (Building program).
The TAX scenario represents a strengthening of market-based climate and energy policy instruments
on top of the baseline policies:
• A tax is levied on electricity consumption at a rate of 10% on retail electricity price in 2020,
increasing linearly up to 50% in 2050.
• The Emissions Trading Scheme stays identical as in the baseline scenario (same assumptions
on permit prices as we assume no modiﬁcations of international policies).
• The CO2 tax on natural gas and heating fuels is increased linearly from 2020 level (72 CHF/t)
to 200 CHF/t in 2050.
• A CO2 tax on transport fuels is introduced at 50 CHF/t in 2035, reaching 200 CHF/t in
2050.
Market based policies are modeled in GENESwIS, while command and control policies (nuclear
phase-out, electricity trade constraints) are modeled in CROSSTEM-CH.
2.4.2 Convergence
For the two scenarios, the framework converges well and reasonably fast. The convergence criterion
on total electricity demand (see eq.(2.11) p.29) reaches a precision of < 1 · 10−4 in respectively 15
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and 24 iterations (ﬁgure 2.8).
After convergence, we check the convergence of other important variables. For these runs, the
maximum deviation of marginal and average costs in any given year is in the order of 10−4.
Convergence Number of iterations
criterion BAU TAX
< 1 · 10−2 4 5
< 1 · 10−3 7 8
< 1 · 10−4 15 24
Figure 2.8 – Convergence performance for the Baseline (BAU) and TAX scenario: Number of
iterations needed for the demand convergence criterion ζ - eq.(2.11) - to reach diﬀerent precision
values.
As discussed in section 2.3.1 p.20, our coupling algorithm determines input quantities and the
proﬁt markup rate such that wholesale electricity price is pushed to market price level (assumed to
follow the long-term marginal cost calculated by the CROSSTEM-CH model from 2025 onwards).
However, the wholesale electricity price is endogenous in GENESwIS and determined by supply and
demand through an appropriate market clearing condition. Nonetheless, we can see on ﬁgure 2.9
that wholesale electricity price matches the market price Pm(t) determined from CROSSTEM-CH’s
costs rapidly.
(a) Baseline (b) TAX scenario
Figure 2.9 – Percentage diﬀerence between the market price determined by CROSSTEM-CH’s
costs and the wholesale electricity price at each iteration for the diﬀerent modeling periods for (a)
the baseline and (b) TAX scenario.
For scenarios with very demanding technological constraints, especially when expensive marginal
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technologies with limited capacities and potentials are involved, the framework can still lock-up in
oscillations between two marginal costs without obtaining convergence, despite the Gauss-Seidel
dampening of demand responses. This is probably due to the fact that this method does not allow
for convergence on a vertical step of the supply curve.
2.4.3 Technology mix and total system cost
Due to the nuclear phase-out, by 2035 almost no electricity is produced with nuclear technology. In
both the baseline and TAX scenarios, this capacity is replaced by base and ﬂexible natural gas power
plants (ﬁgure 2.10a). The ﬂexible gas plants are installed to optimize electricity import/export
patterns and create maximum trade revenue. By 2050, solar PV becomes competitive due to
technology learning and increasing natural gas and CO2 prices, and replaces some of the base gas
power plants. Hydro production reaches its full potential in each period. The reduction in electricity
demand fostered by the market-based policies of the TAX scenario is met mostly by a smaller share
of gas power plants (both base and ﬂexible).
Total system cost increases over the time horizon for both scenarios (ﬁgure 2.10b). A large share
of total cost increase is due to natural gas. Electricity trade revenue increases overtime, counter-
balancing partly the increase in natural gas cost, as some production from ﬂexible gas plants is used
to maximize electricity trade revenue. Although trade volumes are constrained in CROSSTEM-CH
such that no net electricity imports are allowed on a yearly average, the model maximizes trade
revenue by exporting in time-slices where exogenous foreign prices are high. Electricity trade prices
are assumed to increase over time. This increase has two eﬀects: (1) as the model can still optimize
in order to export at times where prices are highest, an increase in trading prices motivates the
model to increase total trade volumes and (2) the revenue increases as import and export prices
increase proportionally. Taxes reported on ﬁgure 2.10b include expenses for CO2 permits in the
emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), and for the Federal levy on nuclear fuel for decommissioning
and disposal funds. The cost of the latter vanishes gradually with the nuclear phase-out, while
expenses into CO2 permits increase due to the larger share of natural gas and the increase in permit
prices.
The lower demand in the TAX compared to the baseline scenario (ﬁgure 2.11b) reduces cost
levels. Costs savings come mostly from smaller expenses for natural gas. The reduction in total
discounted system cost over the whole modeling horizon amounts to1.9 bio CHF2010 in the TAX
scenario compared with the baseline.
2.4.4 Electricity prices and demand
In the TAX scenario, the wholesale electricity price does not vary much compared to the baseline
scenario (ﬁgure 2.11a). This is due to the only minor variations in marginal cost. Indeed, the same
technologies compose the technology mix in both scenarios (ﬁgure 2.10a) and marginal technologies
are the same (at least in yearly average). The price paid by users for retail electricity includes
transport, distribution and taxes. Due to the TAX scenarios’ policies, namely the electricity tax,
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(a) Technology mix for electricity generation
(b) Total system cost
Figure 2.10 – Technology mix for electricity generation [PJ] and total system cost [bioCHF2010] for
the Baseline (BAU) and TAX scenario.
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the user price of electricity increases (ﬁgure 2.11a). This user price increase induces a reduction of
the electricity demand (ﬁgure 2.11b) with regard to the baseline.
(a) Electricity prices variation (b) Electricity demand variation
Figure 2.11 – Variation of (a) wholesale electricity price and electricity price for users (including
distribution costs and tax) and (b) total electricity demand - for the TAX scenario with regard to
the baseline.
2.4.5 Sectoral eﬀects
The environmental and energy policies of the TAX scenario aﬀect the energy sectors the most (ﬁgure
2.12), as can be expected. We observe a noticeable reduction of production for the natural gas
transport and distribution, reﬁneries and electricity generation sectors with regard to the baseline.
The reﬁneries’ reduction in output might be unrealistic. In real life, the reﬁneries might cut down
on reﬁned fuels imports instead of slowing production.
The increase in production of the district heating sector and, to a smaller extent, of the construction
and cement and concrete sectors, are due to a substitution from natural gas and heating fuels to
district heating and insulation (provided by the construction sector). We are aware that these eﬀects
might be somewhat overestimated. In GENESwIS, cement and concrete are demanded solely by
the construction sector and exports, which implies that output changes for the construction sector
usually induce similar output changes for cement and concrete. While in reality some insulation is
indeed achieved with thicker and/or improved concrete walls, we may have overstated the positive
eﬀect on the cement and concrete sector due to the usual homogeneous commodity assumption
for CGE models, which also applies to construction. District heating production is not linked to
combined heat and power plants capacities. Also, bounds on the quantity of available waste are not
taken into account. This may result in an overestimation of the opportunity for increase in district
heat production.
Public transports see their activities increase slightly, while the energy-intensive industries such as
metal production and rest of industry experience a small decrease in output (< 1%).
2.4. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIONS 35
ATP Air and other transport
RDT Road transport
RLT Rail transport
ROS Rest of services
CON Construction
GAS Natural gas transport and distribution
DHT District heating
ELE Electricity generation
CMT Cement and concrete
MET Metals
RFU Reﬁneries
ETS ETS Sectors
ROI Rest of industry
AGR Agriculture
Figure 2.12 – Variation of sectoral production in the TAX scenario compared to the baseline for
the years 2035 and 2050.
2.4.6 CO2 emissions
CO2 emissions from electricity generation are small in 2010. They increase in both scenarios with
the introduction of gas-ﬁred power plants (ﬁgure 2.13a). The penetration of solar PV technology
in 2050 due to increasing natural gas and CO2 permit prices curbs emissions.
CO2 emissions are lower in the TAX scenario than in the baseline as the reduction in demand caused
by TAX policies results in a lower share of natural gas in electricity generation.
For the economy as a whole, we also observe a decrease of CO2 emissions in the TAX scenario
relative to the baseline (ﬁgure 2.13b). This is the expected outcome for scenarios that include
market-based CO2 policies. It is however interesting to note the presence of a substitution eﬀect:
although total CO2 emissions decrease, CO2 emissions from the other sectors (excl. electricity
generation) increase in the TAX scenario relative to the baseline.
Analyzing the CO2 emissions paths by fuel, we observe a regrettable consequence of policies timing:
In the TAX scenario, the CO2 tax on heating fuels is increased from 2020 to 2050. An electricity tax
is introduced in 2020, increasing until 2050. Transport fuels, in contrast, are taxed through the CO2-
tax scheme only from 2035 onwards. The diﬀerent timings of these policies aﬀect the respective
fuel demands and related emissions, triggering the increase in emissions from non-electricity sectors
until 2030.
CO2 emissions from light heating oil are reduced from 2025 onward, due to the CO2 tax (ﬁgure
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(a) CO2 emissions from electricity generation (b) Total CO2 emissions
Figure 2.13 – CO2 emissions - (a) due to electricity generation for the baseline (BAU) and TAX
scenarios [MtCO2] and (b) from fuel consumption by all sectors - including and excluding electricity
generation - for the TAX scenario [percentage variation with regard to the baseline].
(a) CO2 emissions from light heating oil (b) CO2 emissions from transport fuels
(c) CO2 emissions from natural gas (d) Electricity demand from electro-mobility
Figure 2.14 – Variation of CO2 emissions due to (a) light heating oil (b) transport fuels and
(c) natural gas (excluding emissions from electricity generation) in comparison with (d) electricity
demand from electro-mobility - for the TAX scenario with regard to the baseline.
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2.14a). We notice a slight increase of CO2 emissions until 2020 due to inter-temporal eﬀects.
For natural gas, the emission reduction is somewhat delayed (ﬁgure 2.14c). Although natural gas
is a fossil fuel, its emission intensity is lower than light heating oil’s. This implies that under a CO2
tax, there is not only substitution away from natural gas, but also some substitution from oil to
natural gas heating, especially as long as there is still a sizeable share of existing oil heaters.
CO2 emissions from transport fuels increase until 2030 compared to the baseline (ﬁgure 2.14b). As
electricity is taxed earlier, i.e. from 2020 onward, the switch to e-mobility is somewhat discouraged,
and more transport fuels continue to be used. Once transport fuels are also taxed, this eﬀect is
reversed, and e-mobility becomes more attractive (ﬁgure 2.14d). This eﬀect is quite strong in
our model, because of the high elasticity of substitution we had to assume between e-mobility
and transport fuels. In reality, the eﬀect might be smaller. However, it demonstrates, at least
qualitatively, that the timing of policies is crucial for the market penetration of new and cleaner
technologies.
2.4.7 Welfare
The introduction of climate and energy policies in the TAX scenarios induces a small reduction of
welfare with regard to the baseline (0.1%  2 bioCHF). The welfare reduction is mainly due to the
increase of the CO2 tax, the revenues of which are recycled through the Buildings program (subsidy
of 280 mio CHF) and lump-sum transfers. It is indeed unlikely that it originates from the simulated
electricity tax, as its revenues are recycled through the income tax (equal yield constraint) which
does not greatly alter the total excess burden of the tax system.
This welfare loss is likely oﬀset by the beneﬁts of reduced climate change as well as side beneﬁts
of abatement, such as health improvements due to reduced air pollution.
2.4.8 Overall framework assessment
The results presented in this section illustrate the functioning of the ELECTRA-CH modeling
framework and the possible analyses that can be conducted with it. This simulation exercise has
demonstrated that ELECTRA-CH is capable of providing meaningful results. Despite the complex
structure of the coupled framework, the results can be explained and policy-induced impacts can
be tracked down. Furthermore, the framework converges relatively rapidly to robust solutions.
ELECTRA-CH permits to simulate diﬀerent types of energy policies: market-based instruments are
modeled in GENESwIS, while technology restrictions related to electricity generation are included in
CROSSTEM-CH. The results presented in this section demonstrate how impacts of policy shocks
can be observed through variations of sectoral production, CO2 emissions, electricity prices and
demand or overall welfare, as well as on the technology mix13 and total system cost of electricity
generation.
13The scenario modeled in this section did not drastically modify the technology mix. Stronger impacts can be
observed in chapter 4.
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A speciﬁc added value of the coupled framework concerns electricity demand and pricing. In
ELECTRA-CH, electricity demand varies endogenously due to policy-induced changes in prices in
the general equilibrium model. Wholesale electricity prices depend directly on electricity generation
costs and not on generic constant elasticity of substitution production functions as it would be the
case in a pure computable general equilibrium model. In a pure computable general equilibrium set-
ting, the reduction in electricity demand due to the electricity tax would aﬀect wholesale electricity
price: At equilibrium, the end-user price increase would be smaller than the tax, and wholesale elec-
tricity price would be lower than before the tax. With the link to the bottom-up model, wholesale
electricity price is linked to the marginal cost - and hence directly to the technology. In our scenar-
ios, the decrease in demand does not aﬀect marginal costs. Therefore, the wholesale electricity pice
hence does not vary (see results sub-section 2.4.4). The demand reduction is therefore stronger
than what it would be in a pure general equilibrium setting.
2.5 Conclusion
The ELECTRA-CH framework couples a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the Swiss
economy (GENESwIS) with a TIMES electricity supply model for Switzerland (CROSSTEM-CH).
It permits to adequately model both market-based policies and technology restrictions, and analyze
the interactions between these diﬀerent types of policies and initial tax distortions. ELECTRA-CH
simulates the implications for the diﬀerent economic actors (ﬁrms, consumer, government) and
their reactions to climate and energy policies, taking into account the policy induced modiﬁcations
in electricity generation. Moreover, ELECTRA-CH allows to investigate the type of electricity
generation mix that is cost optimal in a given policy environment. Electricity prices are linked to
the technologies used, accounting for both system costs and proﬁt. The degree of liberalization of
the electricity market can be represented appropriately.
The coupling methodology described in this chapter is an alternative to the seminal soft-coupling
algorithm proposed by Böhringer and Rutherford (2009) in situations where a calibrated linear
demand function cannot be introduced in the bottom-up model. In ELECTRA-CH, the bottom-up
model receives the electricity demand simulated by the CGE as an exogenous input and minimizes
total system cost. The ﬂexibility in the algorithm comes from the top-down model. The electricity
generation production function is set as Leontief to ensure that inputs from the bottom-up are set
as ﬁxed shares within one iteration. Additionally, the value of the input quantity parameters and
the proﬁt markup rate are determined - at each iteration - to push the wholesale electricity price
to market price level. However, the wholesale electricity price is endogenous in GENESwIS: It is
determined by supply and demand through an appropriate market clearing condition. Nonetheless,
when the framework approaches convergence, the wholesale electricity price aligns to the market
price. To help with the convergence of the models, we introduce an elasticity of supply in the
electricity transport and distribution sector of the CGE model GENESwIS and dampen the demand
reaction with the help of a Gauss-Seidel method. Our computational experience showed that the
framework behaved nicely, and converged to meaningful results.
The development of the ELECTRA-CH framework has highlighted that a careful harmonization of
the component models is crucial for framework convergence and for producing dependable results.
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Also, the variables to be linked must be meticulously selected and interpreted not to introduce
inaccuracies or logic ﬂaws in the framework. This is particularly the case for the link between
bottom-up costs and top-down wholesale electricity prices. This link and its relationship with market
liberalization is investigated in chapter 3. Finally, the implementation of a demand dampening
method (here Gauss-Seidel) is essential for achieving convergence.
A sizeable, but non-exhaustive wish-list of improvements and enhancements of the model framework
would include:
• Opening the ELECTRA-CH framework to a more precise representation of international elec-
tricity trade: While we were developing the coupled framework ELECTRA-CH, the CROSSTEM
model (Pattupara and Kannan, 2016) has been developed to represent both Switzerland and
its neighboring countries, with endogenous trade. An alternative to coupling GENESwIS with
CROSSTEM could be to inform the CROSSTEM-CH model with trade prices estimated in
CROSSTEM.
• Calibration: The ELECTRA-CH framework was developed as part of a project work for the
Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy. To stay harmonized with the Swiss Energy Perspectives, we
calibrated the framework on projections of electricity demands and CO2 emissions by Prognos
(2012). This calibration required the use of autonomous energy eﬃciency indices that are
not based on projections of technology improvement, but chosen to ﬁt Prognos’ pathways.
For future work, a diﬀerent approach to calibration could be chosen.
• Disaggregate electricity commodities in the CGE model: CROSSTEM-CH models 288 time-
slices for each modeling period. It could be instructive to take advantage of this disaggregation
and introduce diﬀerent electricity commodities (e.g. peak/oﬀ-peak) in GENESwIS. These
commodities would display diﬀerent cost structures.
• A better representation of renewables: Self-production and consumption from domestic re-
newable systems are not modeled in CROSSTEM-CH, which neglects costs savings related
to grid use. Furthermore, feed-in tariﬀ (RPC) and investment subsidies for renewables are
also not taken into account in CROSSTEM-CH.
• Include diﬀerentiated households in the CGE model to enable analyses on distributional eﬀects.
• E-mobility is crudely modeled in our framework as a sub-nest of transport in GENESwIS. The
penetration projections by Prognos (2012) are high, while the existing share of e-mobility
is very small. To calibrate e-mobility demand to the Prognos path, we had to introduce
an elasticity of substitution of 10 between e-mobility and transport fuels. Due to this very
high elasticity, small changes in relative prices between retail electricity and transport fuels
have large impacts on e-mobility demand. Despite this over-sensitivity, the scenarios illustrate
that the timing of policies is crucial for market penetration of new and cleaner technologies.
However, a more bottom-up type of modeling would improve the representation of e-mobility.
For example, displaying discrete technological responses, as in Böhringer (1998) and Böhringer
and Rutherford (2008), could be an option.
• District heating production in ELECTRA-CH is not linked to combined heat and power plants
capacities. Also, bounds on the quantity of available waste are not taken into account. This
results in an overestimation of the opportunity for substitution into district heat. Modeling
combined heat and power generation by taking heat credits into account in the bottom-up
model CROSSTEM-CH would solve this issue.

Chapter 3
Linking electricity prices and costs in
bottom-up top-down coupling under
changing market environments
Abstract
Electricity market liberalization is altering pricing mechanisms in wholesale electricity markets, which
will aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of climate and energy policies. Models used to simulate such policies
must be responsive to pricing rules. We show how this can be done and simulate a tightening of
climate and energy policies. We use a soft-coupled framework composed of a top-down dynamic
computable general equilibrium model and a bottom-up dynamic electricity supply model. The ﬁrst
simulates equilibrium prices and quantities, while the second minimizes electricity generation costs.
In the coupling procedure, the link between wholesale electricity prices (top-down) and generation
costs (bottom-up) depends precisely on regulatory market assumptions. In the regulated market,
wholesale electricity prices are "cost-plus", while they depend on marginal generation costs in the
liberalized market. We show that, in Switzerland, an electricity tax is signiﬁcantly more eﬀective in
reducing electricity demand in the liberalized than in the regulated market.
Keywords: electricity markets; market regulation; policy eﬀectiveness; computable general equi-
librium model; bottom-up energy model; soft-link coupling.
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3.1 Introduction
Price formation depends on market structure and regulation. Traditionally, wholesale electricity
prices were regulated to allow producers to cover their generation costs and achieve an acceptable
proﬁt. Such price regulation provides incentives for new capacity additions as ﬁrms are guaranteed
an acceptable return on investment. Moreover, investment into new capacity may additionally be
fostered with the help of diﬀerent types of subsidies, whether open or covert. In a fully liberalized
competitive market, wholesale electricity is priced at marginal cost. This provides no incentive for
investment unless there is scarcity of capacity, in which case the wholesale price includes a scarcity
rent1, which, in equilibrium, provides incentive for investment into new capacities (International
Energy Agency, 2001).
The current European wholesale electricity market can be described as a largely liberalized market
with overcapacity. Wholesale electricity is increasingly priced at short-term marginal cost. However,
this price is currently too low to provide incentive for investment into new capacity2. In a liberalized
market, such incentive will emerge only as expected prices reﬂect new capacity needs through
scarcity rents at the margin. Today, it is yet unclear whether markets will be fully liberalized or
whether elements of central planning will reappear out of the fear of undesired consequences of
scarce capacity such as outages and price spikes.
The impacts of changing regulatory environments on price formation are potentially relevant for
the eﬀectiveness of energy and climate policies. They must, therefore, be modeled carefully. An
adequate way of modeling electricity markets is to couple bottom-up and top-down models to take
advantage of the qualities of both model types: The bottom-up model provides a detailed set
of electricity generation technologies and minimizes generation costs, while the top-down model
simulates the interactions between economic agents and computes equilibrium prices and quantities.
For their coupling, many approaches have been developed since Hoﬀman and Jorgenson (1977).
Two main currents emerge: "hard linking", which encompasses the two model types into one
single model, and "soft linking", which couples existing full-size models by exchange of variables
(Wene, 1996). The hard linking methodology may be implemented by enhancing one model with
a reduced version of the other (Manne and Wene, 1992; Messner and Schrattenholzer, 2000;
Kombaroglu and Madlener, 2003; Sue Wing, 2006; Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008), or by writing
a hybrid model directly in MCP format (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008; Frei et al., 2003). This
methodological choice ensures consistency within the model, but does not permit a high level of
detail in both technical speciﬁcation and economic interactions. The "soft link" coupling method
(Drouet et al., 2005; Schäfer and Jacoby, 2005; Martinsen, 2011; Sceia et al., 2012; Riekkola et al.,
2013; Fortes et al., 2014) involves keeping the models’ full structure and complexity, exchanging
a chosen set of variables and solving the models iteratively until convergence is reached on a
given criterion. Böhringer and Rutherford (2009), decompose an MCP hybrid model and solve
it iteratively, proposing a more consistent way of soft-coupling models. This approach inspired
1For simpliﬁcation purposes and in line with the scope of our models, we do not consider here transmission
constraints, load ranges nor network externalities. Nonetheless, the general argument remains valid.
2For example, a study from the Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy (2013a) deems 24 out of 25 potential future
hydro projects not viable due to low wholesale electricity prices. The average discounted cost of new hydro plants
is estimated at 141 CHF/MWh, which is considerably higher than the production costs of older plants or current
average wholesale prices.
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implementations by Tuladhar et al. (2009), Lanz and Rausch (2011), and Rausch and Mowers
(2014), the later with full-scale models.
Few studies explicitly link costs from bottom-up models to prices in CGE models. Amongst the
studies that do, diﬀerent assumptions are made:
• Fortes et al. (2014) link total energy costs (average cost) variation from TIMES-Portugal to
energy prices in GEM-E3 Portugal.
• Martinsen (2011) couples MARKAL Norway and the MSG6 CGE model, linking electricity
marginal cost (weighted annual average) to wholesale electricity price.
• Riekkola et al. (2013) link the shadow price (marginal cost) of electricity from TIMES-Sweden
to the electricity price in their CGE model. They note that the price issue is not fully resolved.
• In Rausch and Mowers (2014), electricity is traded at market price, which is set at marginal
cost level as calculated by the ReEDS model. Proﬁts are distributed in the CGE model USREP
to the relevant households.
• Lanz and Rausch (2016) diﬀerentiate between regulated operators, whose wholesale price is
linked to average generation costs, and operators trading on semi-competitive wholesale elec-
tricity markets. They ﬁnd that, in the presence of price-regulated operators, freely allocating
CO2 permits has a negative impact on the eﬃciency of the emissions trading system.
In fact, the link between costs and prices depends on the regulation. This chapter investigates
whether assuming diﬀerent market evolutions, and therefore diﬀerent pricing mechanisms, has an
important implication on the results when modeling electricity markets and their interactions with
the rest of the economy under climate and energy policies.
We build a coupled framework designed to analyze electricity markets and trade in Switzerland.
This framework consists of two component models: a TIMES dynamic electricity supply model
of Switzerland - CROSSTEM-CH - and a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model -
GENESwIS - of the Swiss economy. These two models are coupled through a soft link methodology
such that each model keeps its full structure and coherence and the particular strengths of each
model are used to inform the other model.
The translation of variables between two fundamentally diﬀerent models represents a challenge:
The main diﬃculty comes from the fact that the TIMES electricity supply model yields costs of
electricity generation, whereas the CGE model uses wholesale electricity prices. Moreover, prices
are the main drivers of the CGE model and have a direct impact on the electricity demand that is
reinserted as input to the TIMES model.
We analyze a climate policy scenario for Switzerland under two diﬀerent market assumptions re-
quiring two diﬀerent coupling approaches: (1) a fully regulated market, where wholesale electricity
is priced such that it equals the average cost of electricity production plus a markup, and (2) a pro-
gressive evolution to a fully liberalized market, in which the marginal cost of electricity production
including scarcity rents deﬁnes the price of wholesale electricity.
We show that the way in which costs are linked to prices, and therefore the expectation on market
evolution, has a sizable impact on the results. Notably, we observe a variation of the reduction in
electricity demand induced by the same climate and energy policies.
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3.2 Framework
The modeling framework used for this analysis is described in chapter 2.
It permits to model the link between CROSSTEM-CH’s generation costs and GENESWIS’ wholesale
prices for electricity in diﬀerent ways:
• Cost plus pricing: The wholesale price is set at CROSSTEM-CH’s average cost level plus a
markup to reﬂect agreements under regulation, where ﬁrms are guaranteed to recover their
costs and earn an acceptable return on investments.
• Marginal cost pricing: Electricity is priced at CROSSTEM-CH’s marginal cost3 level and proﬁt
is introduced in GENESwIS to represent producer surplus.
3.3 Scenarios
We simulate a baseline and a policy scenario for two diﬀerent types of electricity markets in Switzer-
land: a regulated market, and progressive liberalization to a fully liberalized market (see table 3.1).
Table 3.1 – Scenarios matrix
Policy scenarios
Baseline (BAU) Tax (TAX)
Market regulation Regulated market BAU_REG TAX_REG
scenarios Liberalized market BAU_LIB TAX_LIB
The baseline (BAU) scenarios are based on the “weiter wie bisher" (i.e. “more of the same") scenario
of the Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy (Prognos, 2012). They include current policies such as an
Emissions Trading Scheme, a CO2 tax on natural gas and heating fuels for the non-ETS sectors
and households, and a subsidy program for the energy refurbishment of buildings. For each pricing
scenario, the GENESwIS model is calibrated such that electricity demands and CO2 emissions follow
the paths projected by Prognos (2012).
The TAX scenarios represent more stringent climate and energy policies. A tax is levied on electricity
at a rate of 10% in 2020, increasing linearly to 50% in 2050. The Emissions Trading Scheme stays
identical as in the BAU scenario, but the CO2 tax on natural gas and heating fuels is increased
linearly from current level (60 CHF/t) to 200 CHF/t in 2050. A CO2 tax on transport fuels is
introduced at 50 CHF/t in 2035, reaching 200 CHF/t in 2050.
Under regulation (scenario REG), ﬁrms are usually allowed to cover their costs and make an appro-
priate proﬁt. We assume accordingly that electricity is priced at average cost plus a small markup.
3CROSSTEM-CH’s marginal cost is the shadow price of the commodity balance and represents the increase in
total system cost due to an additional unit of demand (Loulou et al., 2005). It reﬂects all constraints and costs (incl.
investment cost) and can therefore be seen as marginal cost including scarcity rents for capacity. As the CGE model
does not disaggregate the year into 288 time slices, the marginal cost is aggregated to an annual demand-weighted
marginal cost.
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We assume in the liberalized market scenario (LIB) that the electricity market will be entirely
liberalized from 2025 onwards and that the price will then follow the long-term marginal cost of the
bottom-up model. From 2010 to 2025, the market is in transition and prices reﬂect an increasing
importance of marginal cost pricing. Proﬁt is calculated such that the price of wholesale electricity
is pushed from the average cost given by the CROSSTEM-CH model (AC) to the assumed market
price (Pm)4.
Proﬁt(t) =
Pm(t)− AC(t)
AC(t)
(3.1)
We analyze the policy scenarios for the two market regulation assumptions TAX_LIB and TAX_REG
as deviations from the respective baseline scenarios BAU_LIB and BAU_REG5.
3.4 Mechanisms at work
3.4.1 Prices in the baseline scenarios
As mentioned above, the wholesale electricity market prices simulated in the baselines for the
two diﬀerent market regulation scenarios diverge. As can be seen in ﬁgure 3.1, annual average
and marginal costs for the targeted baseline demands are distinct not only in level, but also in
evolution. According to whether we assume a regulated market (REG) or a liberalized market
(LIB), the wholesale electricity prices are linked to respectively the average cost or marginal cost
of the bottom-up model. This largely speciﬁes the level and evolution of the prices in each market
scenario.
3.4.2 The eﬀects of an electricity tax
A tax on electricity consumption increases end-user prices for electricity. In equilibrium, however,
this end-user prices increase does not amount exactly to the level of the tax. The reasons are
twofold:
4With Pm(2010) = historical price, Pm(2015) = 23AC(2015) +
1
3
MC(2015), Pm(2020) = 13AC(2020) +
2
3
MC(2020), and Pm(t ≥ 2025) = MC(t).
5It is uncommon in a CGE setting to have two diﬀerent baselines. Actually, policies and central targeted baseline
parameters, namely electricity demands and CO2 emissions per fuels, are identical in both the regulated and the
liberalized baseline. However, for the targeted parameters to follow these baseline trends, it is necessary to recalibrate
the model framework. Indeed, under the diﬀerent coupling mechanisms, electricity prices are linked either to average
or marginal costs, which have diﬀerent levels (ﬁgure 3.1). Autonomous energy eﬃciency indices are hence modiﬁed
in the CGE model such that electricity demand follows the baseline trend in both situations.This allows us to analyze
how the variation of marginal (respectively average) costs inﬂuences the eﬃciency of energy and climate policies.
In this experiment, we do not focus on the issue of how absolute cost levels aﬀect the economy. For this reason,
comparing a regulated baseline to a liberalized scenario would not serve our purpose. Instead, we need one baseline
deﬁnition for both market settings, in terms of electricity demand. Otherwise, diﬀering demand paths would push
the bottom-up model to opt for diﬀerent technology mixes already in the baseline. This would severely complicate
the analysis of regulatory assumptions.
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Figure 3.1 – Wholesale electricity prices under the two baselines (LIB for the liberalized market and
REG for the regulated market) in comparison with annual average (AC) and marginal (MC) costs
from the CROSSTEM-CH model.
• Electricity demand is ﬂexible: A rise in end-user price induces a reduction in demand. The
new equilibrium price will hence be lower than the initial price plus the tax.
• This new (and reduced) electricity demand is then passed on to the CROSSTEM-CH model
(see ﬁgure 2.3), which lowers electricity generation and hence alters generation costs. As
generation costs are linked to the wholesale electricity price, their alteration will, in turn, have
an eﬀect on end-user prices.
To analyze the eﬀects of an electricity tax on the electricity demand reaction and end-user prices,
we thus also need to analyze the inﬂuence of changes in demand on generation costs.
3.4.3 The eﬀect of demand changes on marginal and average generation
costs
Both average and marginal costs generated by the CROSSTEM-CH model include all relevant costs,
i.e. fuel costs, operation and maintenance costs, investment costs, taxes, and the electricity trade
deﬁcit (which is usually negative for Switzerland, i.e. a trade surplus). They both depend on the
composition of the technology mix, albeit in diﬀerent ways: The marginal cost is linked to marginal
technologies, whereas the average cost depends largely on the degree of utilization of technologies
with high variable costs, such as gas-ﬁred power plants.
Thereby, technology restrictions, or an increase in demand large enough to require the introduction
of a more expensive technology, will increase the marginal cost. Likewise, a reduction in demand
important enough to make the most expensive technology obsolete, will decrease the marginal cost.
For the average cost, things are more complicated, because the direction of change depends not only
on the marginal technology, but on the technology and cost structure as a whole. For example, if
the technology mix is composed mostly of technologies with high ﬁxed costs, a decrease in demand
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increases average cost. In contrast, if the technology mix includes a large share of technologies
with high variable costs, a decrease in demand also decreases average cost.
3.5 Results
In this section, we analyze the eﬀects of the TAX scenario policies under two diﬀerent market
assumptions: gradual liberalization (LIB) and regulation (REG) in the Swiss context.
3.5.1 Generation costs
Electricity generation mix and total system cost
In 2010, Switzerland’s electricity generation mix was largely CO2-free, composed mostly of hydro-
and nuclear-generated electricity. The nuclear phase-out implies, for our model, that the oldest
nuclear power plant reaches the end of its lifetime in 2020, and that, by 2035, almost no electricity
is produced with nuclear technology. In answer to this phase-out, CROSSTEM-CH chooses a mix
of base and ﬂexible gas plants6. The purpose of ﬂexible gas plants is to optimize import/export
patterns and create maximum trade revenue. By 2050, solar PV becomes competitive7 (ﬁgure
3.2a) due to technology learning and increasing natural gas and CO2 permit prices. Although the
TAX scenarios reduce electricity demand, the types of technologies installed stay identical to the
baseline. Solely the amount of electricity produced with gas-ﬁred power plants varies.
As can be seen on ﬁgure 3.2b, the total system cost is composed mostly of capital, operation
and maintenance (O&M), natural gas and nuclear fuel costs, taxes, and trade revenue8. Capital
costs increase in 2050 with the investment into solar technology. Although electricity production by
gas-ﬁred power plants decreases in the later years, expenses into natural gas stay important due to
increasing prices assumptions. Although all costs decrease in the TAX scenarios with regard to the
baseline, most of the cost-saving is due to a reduction of natural gas and associated CO2 permit
costs.
Marginal cost
As can be seen in ﬁgure 3.3a, the marginal cost does not vary greatly for the TAX scenarios relative
to the baselines for either of the market regulation scenarios. Demand reductions under the TAX
scenarios are not large enough to shock the technology mix deeply, and there are no technology
restrictions in addition to the baselines. Therefore, marginal technologies (ﬁgure 3.2a), and hence
6Coal and oil technologies are prohibited.
7No subsidies for renewable technologies are modeled in the CROSSTEM-CH model.
8Although trade is constrained such that no net imports are allowed, resulting in a net trade of zero in energy
terms, the model optimizes hydro pumps and ﬂexible gas production to export when prices are high and thus create
a net-trade revenue.
48 CHAPTER 3. LINKING ELECTRICITY PRICES AND COSTS
(a) Electricity generation mix
(b) Undiscounted system costs of electricity generation
Figure 3.2 – Electricity generation mix [PJ] and undiscounted system costs of electricity generation
[bio CHF2010] for the baseline BAU (results for BAU_REG and BAU_LIB are identical) and for
the TAX scenarios TAX_REG (regulated market) and TAX_LIB (gradually liberalized market).
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the marginal cost, do not change much in annual average (although they may change in some
particular time-slices).
Average cost
In contrast, average cost is reduced in the TAX scenarios relative to the baselines (ﬁgure 3.3a).
Variable costs represent a major share of total cost (ﬁgure 3.2b - variable costs are pictured in
patterned, and ﬁxed costs in solid color bars). This is due to a technology mix comprising many
depreciated plants and to the optimized cost structure of the CROSSTEM-CH model. Furthermore,
at each iteration, the investment decisions as well as running-schedules are re-optimized over the
entire time horizon of the model, which further increases the total proportion of costs that are
eﬀectively variable in the simulations. A dominant share of variable costs implies that average cost
is lower when less electricity is produced.
The variation of average cost for the liberalized market (TAX_LIB) is greater than under regulation
(TAX_REG). This is due to the fact that total electricity demand is reduced further in the liberalized
market scenario than in the regulated market scenario.
3.5.2 From costs to end user prices under alternative market regulation
We will now investigate what the diﬀerent responses of the marginal and average costs imply for the
wholesale, retail and end-user prices, and for electricity demand under alternative market regulations
in Switzerland.
Liberalized market
In the scenarios with gradual market liberalization, wholesale electricity prices are increasingly linked
to the marginal cost. We observe that the marginal cost is not greatly aﬀected by the demand
reduction induced by the TAX_LIB scenario (ﬁgure 3.3a). As a result, wholesale electricity prices
(ﬁgure 3.3b) are impacted only slightly. Retail electricity corresponds to electricity transported
and distributed to the users. An important share of its production cost is due to the purchase of
wholesale electricity. The prices of commodities and services constituting the remaining share are
not aﬀected greatly by the policies of the TAX_LIB scenario. Hence, retail electricity prices vary in
the same direction as wholesale electricity prices, although this variation is dampened (ﬁgure 3.3b).
End user prices are deﬁned as retail prices plus tax. The electricity tax included in the TAX scenario
raises the end user price of electricity (ﬁgure 3.4a), which reduces electricity demand (ﬁgure 3.4b).
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(a) Average and marginal costs (b) Wholesale and retail electricity prices
Figure 3.3 – From costs to retail prices: Percentage change of - (a) average cost (AC) and
marginal cost (MC), and (b) wholesale and retail electricity prices - for the scenarios TAX_LIB and
TAX_REG compared to the baselines BAU_LIB and BAU_REG respectively.
(a) End user prices (gross of tax) for electricity (b) Electricity demands
Figure 3.4 – From retail prices to demands: Percentage change of - (a) electricity prices paid by
the end users (gross of tax) and retail electricity prices (net of tax), and (b) electricity demands -
for the scenarios TAX_LIB and TAX_REG compared to the baselines BAU_LIB and BAU_REG
respectively.
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Regulated market
For the regulated market scenarios, wholesale electricity prices are closely linked to average cost.
They are therefore reduced as a result of the electricity demand reduction induced by the energy
policies, namely the electricity tax, included in the TAX_REG scenario (ﬁgures 3.3a&b). Con-
sequently, retail electricity prices also decrease relative to the baseline (ﬁgure 3.3b). Hence, the
end user price increase (gross of tax) is smaller in the regulated market (TAX_REG) than in the
liberalized market (TAX_LIB), as can be seen in ﬁgure 3.4a. The resulting reduction in demand is
therefore smaller in the regulated market than in the liberalized market (ﬁgure 3.4b).
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we show that assumptions on the future evolution of electricity market regulation
have an impact on the eﬀectiveness of electricity taxes to curb demand. In a coupled bottom-up
top-down modeling framework, the way we translate costs into prices needs to reﬂect the nature
of market regulation.
The regulated market, which links wholesale electricity market prices to average costs, is easier to
model, because it avoids the numerical convergence issues stemming from the stepwise behavior
of marginal costs. However, if the market is not tightly regulated, this linking assumption is inap-
propriate and leads to its misrepresentation. As a consequence, the estimation of the eﬀectiveness
of energy or climate policies is erroneous. As we have shown, the electricity demand reduction
fostered by market-based policies is stronger in a liberalized setting than in a regulated market.
Before generalizing this result, some caveats are in order. First of all, the marginal cost assumed
in our modeling framework is a demand-weighted annual average of the marginal costs for all time
slices, which is a strong simpliﬁcation. In addition, we assume that electricity generation is optimized
over the full modeling horizon with perfect foresight. Finally, we make speciﬁc, albeit representative
for Switzerland, assumptions about policy changes and available technologies. Further research is
needed to explore the consequences of modiﬁed pricing mechanisms in (partially) liberalized markets
under diﬀerent national circumstances, policies and technological options.
Notwithstanding, it is important to take ongoing and projected market liberalization into account
and to disclose pricing assumptions when interpreting models’ results.

Chapter 4
Welfare eﬀects of technology
restrictions for electricity generation
Abstract
Technology restrictions are still widely used in energy policy. Concerns about security, climate,
or jobs preservation induce political quasi-selections of electricity generation technologies. Instru-
ments inherited from regulation, technology restrictions may have diﬀerent impacts on the economy
when markets are largely liberalized. We use ELECTRA-CH, a coupled top-down bottom-up model
framework to analyze two electricity supply options for Switzerland after nuclear phase-out: (1) a
balanced-trade scenario in which Switzerland’s annual electricity production must be equal to its
consumption and (2) a no-gas scenario that forbids gas-ﬁred power plants, but accepts net elec-
tricity imports. We ﬁnd that technology restrictions alter both electricity generation cost functions
and price levels. For Switzerland, the prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants and relaxation of trade
constraints lower average cost while increasing marginal cost. With marginal cost pricing in lib-
eralized markets, this increases proﬁts. Reduction in total system cost and increase in electricity
price aﬀect welfare in opposite ways. A pure bottom-up analysis would overestimate the beneﬁts
of technology restrictions.
Keywords: electricity markets; technology restrictions; soft-link coupling; top-down model;
bottom-up model; policy analysis
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4.1 Introduction
Despite market liberalization, technology restrictions and political quasi-selection of electricity gen-
eration technologies have increased rather than decreased in many countries. Motivations to do so
are multiple: safety concerns, reducing import dependence, environment and climate protection, the
will to create or keep jobs in a region, competitiveness issues, or political agendas. Although there
may be good reasons to opt for technology restrictions, this chapter focusses on how to adequately
assess the costs of such choices.
Switzerland, with its energy policy in full transition, is an interesting case study. The Energy
Strategy 2050, elaborated by the Swiss Federal Council, has for objective to warrant an energy
supply for Switzerland that is cost-eﬀective, respectful of the environment and secure. The policy
focus is on the improvement of energy eﬃciency and the promotion of renewables. This focus is
planned to be achieved, from 2020, through market-based policies. The Swiss electricity market is
partly liberalized and to be further integrated within the larger European market.
Switzerland’s current electricity generation park is composed mostly of nuclear (37.9%) and hydro
power plants (56.4%) (Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy, 2015). Following the Fukushima nuclear
disaster in 2011, the Swiss Federal Council decided to decommission nuclear power plants at the
end of their safe operational lifetime (the nature and time scale of which is yet to be agreed upon)
without replacing them by newer generation nuclear plants. Switzerland has been now accustomed
to a largely CO2-free electricity generation, and has vouched to domestically reduce its emissions
by 30%1 in 2030 compared with 1990.
The Energy Perspectives 2050 (Prognos, 2012), commissioned by the Federal Oﬃce of Energy,
imagine three energy policy scenarios, resulting in diﬀerent demand paths, as well as three electricity
supply options to answer electricity demands taking nuclear phase-out into account. These supply
options are the following: (1) gas-ﬁred power plants, (2) gas-ﬁred power plants and renewables, and
(3) renewables with the help of electricity imports. Prognos (2012) simulate this set of scenarios
with a bottom-up model performing an "If-then" type of analysis: Exogenous border conditions on
energy prices, population and GDP growth drive the model, while the diﬀerent policy measures and
objectives modify the possible options and pathways. This modeling study captures only the direct
costs on the energy system.
To complement the analysis, Ecoplan (2012) investigate the economic eﬀects of the energy policy
scenarios put forward in the Energy Perspectives 2050 with the help of a computable general
equilibrium model. They simulate policies2 (CO2 tax on heating and transport fuels, emissions
trading system for big emitters, and electricity tax) such that CO2 emissions and energy demands
follow projections by Prognos (2012). All simulations are done with the electricity supply option
that includes gas-ﬁred power plants.
Gas-ﬁred power plants are, in many countries with existing coal-ﬁred power plants, considered to
be the cleaner option. However, in Switzerland, a future generation park including gas-ﬁred power
plants would drastically increase CO2 emissions from electricity generation. These additional emis-
1Switzerland vouched to reduce it’s emissions by 50% in 2030, the majority of which (minimum 30%) domestically.
The remaining 20% can come from quality overseas projects.
2The policies implemented are not exactly the policies planned in the Energy Perspectives.
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sions would have to be compensated by stronger eﬀorts in other sectors of the Swiss economy.
Currently, the CO2 law3 stipulates that fossil thermal power plants will be approved in Switzerland
only if they fully compensate for their CO2 emissions. Additionally, at least 50% of their com-
pensation performance must be rendered domestically. This strong regulation is quite prohibitive
and keeps Swiss ﬁrms from investing into gas-ﬁred power plants in Switzerland. Alternatively, they
invest abroad in gas-ﬁred power plants4. For the gas-ﬁred power plants supply options of the Energy
Strategy to materialize, the domestic compensation condition of the CO2 law might have to be
relaxed or alleviated through carbon capture and sequestration.
To keep a CO2-free electricity generation sector, Switzerland could promote renewables. However,
investments into renewable energy might not be important enough5 in the mid-term to answer
electricity demand. Without drastic energy eﬃciency measures to reduce electricity consumption,
Switzerland would have to rely on electricity imports from its neighbors. This supply scenario raises
concerns about energy security (although Switzerland would be less reliant on gas imports) and
public control6.
The nuclear phase-out is perhaps, of late, the most widely studied technology restriction for elec-
tricity generation in Switzerland. Some studies involve bottom-up models (Weidmann et al., 2012;
Prognos, 2012), which are, by construction, very detailed technically but model only partial equilib-
rium. They report variations on total system cost (only direct costs). Others analyze the nuclear
phase-out with computable general equilibrium models, whose electricity generation production func-
tion has been modiﬁed to display discrete technological response (Böhringer et al., 2001; Bretschger
et al., 2012). These studies are able to analyze the eﬀects on welfare (Hicks equivalent variation)
and the economy as a whole, as well as changes in the overall excess burden of the tax system.
However, their hybrid representation of electricity generation options has limited technological detail
compared to full-size bottom-up models.
In this chapter, we endeavor to investigate the eﬀect of technology restrictions concerning gas-ﬁred
power plants, with the added insight of combining top-down and bottom-up information in a single
framework (Hourcade et al., 2006).
We analyze two scenarios, inspired by the supply options of the Energy Perspectives: (1) a balanced-
trade scenario in which Switzerland’s annual electricity production must be equal to its consumption;
and (2) a no-gas scenario which forbids gas-ﬁred power plants, but accepts net electricity imports.
The policy landscape is the same in both scenarios, including strengthened market-based energy
and climate policies, liberalization of electricity markets, and the decommissioning of nuclear power-
plants after a 50-year operational lifetime. We conduct this analysis with the help of the top-down
bottom-up coupled framework ELECTRA-CH, developed in this thesis.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 refers to the methodology description in chapter
2 and is followed by a description of the scenarios in section 4.3. Section 4.4 discusses the results
3Loi fédérale du 23 décembre 2011 sur la réduction des émissions de CO2 (Loi sur le CO2), RS: 641.71 et
Ordonnance du 30 novembre 2012 sur la réduction des émissions de CO2 (Ordonnance sur le CO2), RS: 641.711.
4For example, BKW invested in gas-ﬁred power plants in Italy, and Alpiq in Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy.
5Despite the technical potential being available, economic, administrative and social issues reduce the real potential
of renewables. Speciﬁcally, projects implementations are slowed down by the long waiting list for feed-in tariﬀ,
authorization procedures and lack of social acceptance (Swiss Federal Oﬃce of Energy, 2012).
6In Switzerland, municipalities and cantons are the shareholders holding the majority of electricity generation
ﬁrms.
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and section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model
The coupling procedure and models used for this analysis are described in chapter 2. For this study,
we assume a gradual liberalization of electricity markets (see ﬁgure 2.5, 23).
4.3 Scenarios
We compare simulation results for two scenarios inspired by the Swiss Energy Strategy: GAS
and NoGAS, which diﬀer from each other mainly by the prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants and
restriction on net trade for the electricity sector.
The GAS scenario is inspired by the supply option C of the Swiss Energy Strategy, where part of the
nuclear power plants capacity is replaced with gas-ﬁred power plants. In the following analysis, we
consider the GAS scenario to be the reference scenario. We do not, however, refer it as such, as we
are not in a liberal world with completely free-markets. The GAS scenario indeed already includes
many restrictions (e.g. nuclear phase-out, import restrictions, no coal production). We assume
that, for gas-ﬁred power plants to be built in Switzerland, the domestic compensation condition of
the CO2 law would have to be relaxed. We therefore consider CO2 emissions from gas-ﬁred power
plants in the GAS scenario to be compensated through the emissions trading scheme (ETS), which
is linked to the European ETS.
The NoGAS scenario forbids gas-ﬁred power plants: all domestic electricity must be produced with
renewables. As in supply option E of the Swiss Energy Strategy, we let Switzerland be a net importer
of electricity annually.
Both scenarios include the following energy and climate policies:
• Nuclear power plants are phased-out at the end of an assumed lifetime of 50 years and
not replaced by new-generation plants. Eﬀectively, no electricity is produced with nuclear
technology after 2035.
• A tax on electricity consumption amounting to 10% of the electricity retail price in 2020,
increasing linearly to 50% in 2050.
• An emissions trading scheme (ETS), linked to the European ETS. Switzerland is not expected
to have a large impact on CO2 prices, which are thus exogenous, following projections by
Prognos (2012).
• A CO2 tax on natural gas and heating fuels consumption for the non-ETS sectors and house-
holds. The level of this tax is set at 36 CHF/t in 2010, increasing linearly to 200 CHF/t
in 2050. A share of 250 mioCHF from the CO2 tax revenue is recycled through a building
(insulation) subsidy.
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• A CO2 tax on transport fuels consumption starting at 50 CHF/t in 2035, increasing linearly
to 200 CHF/t in 2050.
In the GAS scenario, net electricity trade is constrained such that Switzerland cannot be a net
importer on annual average. However, the CROSSTEM-CH model optimizes trade revenue within
the year: importing when it needs to or when exogenous foreign prices are low, and exporting when
prices are high. This usually results in trade volumes being equal, and the creation of a positive
trade revenue.
In the NoGAS scenario, gas-ﬁred power plants are prohibited. However, the trade constraint is
relaxed: a given amount of net electricity can be imported annually. This amount7 was chosen to
be equivalent to the quantity (in energy units) of natural gas imported for electricity generation
in the GAS scenario. This assumption is a very crude way of designing scenarios that might be
equivalent with regard to energy security, without knowing the relative supply risk of each energy
carrier.
A recapitulation of the energy and climate policies for the GAS and NoGAS scenarios can be found
in table 4.1.
Table 4.1 – Comparison of the energy and climate policies (market instruments - modeled in
GENESwIS - and technology & import restrictions applied to the electricity sector - modeled in
CROSSTEM-CH) for the GAS and NoGAS scenarios.
GAS NoGAS
Market
ETS scheme same as GAS
CO2 tax (gas and heating fuels) same as GAS
instruments CO2 tax (transport fuels) same as GAS
Electricity tax same as GAS
Technology Nuclear phase-out same as GAS
& import No coal-ﬁred power plants same as GAS
restrictions No net imports of electricity (annually) Net imports allowed (annually)
- No gas-ﬁred power plants
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Generation costs and technology mix
The nuclear phase-out implies that, by 2035, almost no electricity is produced with nuclear technol-
ogy. In the GAS scenario, this capacity is replaced by base and ﬂexible natural gas power plants. The
ﬂexible gas plants are installed to optimize import/export patterns and create maximum trade rev-
enue. By 2050, solar photovoltaics becomes competitive due to technology learning and increasing
7The model does not reach this upper-bound.
58 CHAPTER 4. WELFARE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY RESTRICTIONS
natural gas and CO2 prices8 (ﬁgure 4.1a).
In the NoGAS scenario, gas-ﬁred power plants are prohibited, and some net imports allowed. In the
near and medium term, the CROSSTEM-CH model deems more cost-eﬀective to import electricity
rather than invest in expensive renewable technologies9. By 2045, however, electricity import prices
assumptions10 have risen, and renewable technologies such as solar PV and wood/biomass plants
become competitive.
The total system cost (ﬁgure 4.1b) is noticeably lower for the NoGAS scenario than for the GAS
scenario. The system saves mostly on variable costs: fuel cost (natural gas), taxes (CO2 permits),
and variable operation and maintenance costs. Despite Switzerland being a net importer in the
NoGAS scenario, the optimization of trade within the time slices permits the system to make a net
surplus for most of the model horizon (except in 2035). As no gas-ﬁred power plants are built in
the earlier years, capital costs are lower. However, in the later years, more renewable capacities are
installed and capital cost is slightly higher than for the GAS scenario.
As an aggregate over the whole modeling horizon, the present value11 of total system cost is reduced
by 4.2 bio CHF2010 in the NoGAS scenario with regard to the GAS scenario.
4.4.2 Electricity costs, prices and demand
The marginal cost of electricity in the NoGAS scenario is generally higher than in the GAS scenario
(ﬁgure 4.2a) due to trade price assumptions, which increase at a much higher rate than natural
gas prices. In the immediate (2015), however, the price of imported electricity is lower (22.86
CHF2010/GJ) than the marginal cost of gas-ﬁred power plants (38.4 CHF2010/GJ for an existing
plant, and 28.5 CHF2010/GJ for a new plant); it is therefore cheaper to import electricity rather
than relying on generation by gas-ﬁred power plants. By 2020, import prices are comparable to the
marginal cost of gas-ﬁred power plants, and from 2025 onwards, electricity generated by gas plants
is cheaper than imported electricity. Hence, the long-term marginal cost increases from 2020 on in
the NoGAS scenario compared with the GAS scenario.
As a consequence, the wholesale electricity price increases accordingly (ﬁgure 4.2b). The electricity
price paid by users includes the purchase of wholesale electricity, transport and distribution costs,
and taxes. The prices of commodities and services needed for transport and distribution are not
aﬀected by the prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants, and market-based policies are identical for both
scenarios. Hence, end-user prices vary in the same way as wholesale electricity prices, although this
variation is dampened (ﬁgure 4.2b).
As an expected consequence of the end-user price increase, total electricity demand decreases (ﬁgure
8Sources: gas price from World Energy Outlook (International Energy Agency, 2010) and CO2 prices following
EU ETS permit prices projections by Prognos (2012).
9No subsidies or feed-in tarrif for renewable technologies are modeled in the CROSSTEM-CH model.
10Trade prices assumptions are speciﬁed for the four neighboring countries: France, Italy, Austria and Germany.
Yearly import prices are taken from the ADAM project (www.adamproject.eu). Export prices are pegged to import
prices. A description of the determination of time-slice variations of import prices can be found in Kannan and Turton
(2011)
11Discount rate of 4.5%
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(a) Electricity generation mix
(b) Total electricity system cost
Figure 4.1 – Swiss electricity generation mix [PJ] and total undiscounted system cost of electricity
generation [bio CHF2010] for the GAS and NoGAS scenarios.
60 CHAPTER 4. WELFARE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY RESTRICTIONS
(a) Marginal and average costs of electricity genera-
tion
(b) Electricity prices
(c) Electricity demand (d) CO2 emissions from fuels
Figure 4.2 – Variation - for the NoGAS scenario with regard to the GAS scenario - of (a) marginal and
average costs of electricity generation, (b) wholesale electricity price (net of tax) and electricity price
for users (gross of distribution costs and tax), (c) electricity demand per type of use (appliances,
heat and transport), and (d) CO2 emissions from fuels (transport fuels, light heating oil, and natural
gas (including and excluding emissions from electricity generation)).
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4.2c) in the NoGAS scenario with regards to the GAS scenario. Electricity used for appliances does
not react strongly to the end-user price increase as it is not easily substituted. For heating, however,
natural gas, light heating oil, district heating and better insulation can be chosen over electricity use
(see nestings on ﬁgure 2.1 p.13 and ﬁgure 2.2 p.14). We can see on ﬁgure 4.2d that CO2 emissions
from light heating oil and natural gas (excluding emissions from electricity generation) increase as
a result of the substitution away from electricity for heating purposes. The decrease in electricity
demanded for transportation is overstimated. This strong reaction to the electricity price increase
is due to the high elasticity of substitution assumption on e-mobility, chosen to calibrate the model
to high penetration projections by Prognos (2012). The related increase in CO2 emissions from
transport fuels is accordingly strong.
Due to the prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants, CO2 emissions from natural gas, including the inter-
mediate demand for electricity generation, decrease through time in the NoGAS scenario compared
with the GAS scenario (ﬁgure 4.2d - natural gas incl. ele.). This has for eﬀect to reduce overall
fuel-related CO2 emissions. However, total fuel-related emissions excluding electricity generation
increase by ∼ 5% in the second half of the modeling period. Indeed, electricity price variations
prompted by technology restrictions modify relative prices between electricity and other energy
carriers, which induces substitution towards other energy carriers.
Although electricity demand is lower in the NoGAS scenario compared with the GAS scenario, the
total system cost decreases more than proportionally: Average cost is approximately 20% lower in
the NoGAS scenario than in the GAS scenario (ﬁgure 4.2a).
4.4.3 Investment
In the coupled framework, the CROSSTEM-CH model optimizes investment decisions for electricity
generation, which determine yearly capital inputs in GENESwIS’ electricity generation production
function. GENESwIS simulates12 investment decisions, and hence capital accumulation which sat-
isfy the demand for capital in the electricity sector. This aﬀects investment and capital formation
for the other sectors (industry and services) through crowding-out eﬀects.
The NoGAS scenario requires less capital for electricity generation than the GAS scenario (ﬁgures
4.1b and 4.3), simply because no gas plants are built and imports increase. This has a crowding-in
eﬀect on the other sectors. Variations of capital for industry sectors are more responsive than for
services (relative to their size).
In the NoGAS scenario, the CROSSTEM-CH model invests in solar photovoltaics capacity ( 10
PJ), which becomes competitive in 2045, instead of 2050 in the GAS scenario. This explains the
abrupt13 increase in investment in 2040 (ﬁgure 4.3) in the NoGAS scenario in comparison with the
GAS scenario.
12In GENESwIS, Capital is modeled as putty-clay. Thus, capital, once it is invested into one sector (industry,
services or electricity), cannot be transformed into capital for another sector. Households optimize total welfare over
the whole modeling horizon by choosing between consumption in a given year or saving to increase their utility at
another time. Utilities of diﬀerent years can be substituted to each other through an inter temporal elasticity of
substitution of 0.2.
13These types of sharp transitions are intrinsic to bottom-up modeling and transpire through the coupling of the
models.
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Despite the crowding-in eﬀect, total investment is reduced in the NoGAS scenario compared with
the GAS scenario (ﬁgure 4.3). Actually, relative factor prices change by 3% in favor of labor in the
NoGAS scenario with regards to the GAS scenario.
Figure 4.3 – Variation of investments for the electricity, industry and services sectors in the NoGAS
scenario with regard to the GAS scenario [mio CHF2010].
4.4.4 Welfare and consumption
We observe an increase in welfare14 of 0.05%, amounting to a present value of 0.98 bio CHF2010 in
the NoGAS scenario compared to the GAS scenario, indicating that prohibition of gas-ﬁred power
plants and relaxation of the trade constraints have a positive eﬀect on the economy. Yet, the
electricity supply model, CROSSTEM-CH, shows a reduction in the present value of total system
cost of 4.2 bio CHF2010. General equilibrium eﬀects usually tend to smoothen policy shocks and
maximize utility. In this sub-section, we investigate the eﬀect responsible for welfare increasing less
than the decrease in total system cost.
To understand this diﬀerence, we have to go back to the way wholesale electricity is priced. In our
simulations, the wholesale electricity price is linked to the marginal cost of electricity generation
(market fully liberalized from 2025 onwards). It is composed of the average cost of electricity
generation plus a markup (see eq. (2.8) p.22), which pushes wholesale electricity price to marginal
cost level. Proﬁt is redistributed lump-sum to the representative household.
The prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants and relaxation of the trade constraints have an opposite
eﬀect on marginal and average costs: marginal cost increases, while average cost decreases (ﬁgure
14Beneﬁts from the reduction of external eﬀects are not taken into account in our welfare assessment. Also, we
do not keep the CO2 emissions target constant for Switzerland across scenarios: With an emissions trading scheme
(ETS) linked to the European ETS, the additional domestic emissions in Switzerland will be oﬀset elsewhere in
Europe. The electricity sector is part of the ETS and we assumed Switzerland to be a price taker on the permits
market. The small open economy assumption also implies that the Swiss equilibrium remains unaﬀected by any
terms of trade eﬀects which could in fact be prompted by the additional abatement abroad. Hence, we believe that
a welfare assessment with these scenarios is still valid under the set of assumptions of the modeling framework.
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4.2a). This means that electricity is more expensive in the NoGAS scenario, although total system
cost is lower. As a consequence, the markup increases (ﬁgure 4.4), generating larger proﬁts.
Figure 4.4 – Wholesale electricity price and its components: average cost and proﬁt markup for the
GAS and NoGAS scenarios [mio CHF2010/PJ].
The variations of total system cost and wholesale electricity price have diﬀerent eﬀects on welfare:
1. The cost saving eﬀect associated with the reduction in total system cost is translated into
an increase in welfare.
2. The increase in marginal cost, and hence in wholesale electricity price, has a negative eﬀect
on welfare.
The resulting combination is an increase in welfare that is smaller than what would be expected
from looking only at the total system cost reduction.
Let us illustrate item 2 with a simpliﬁed partial-equilibrium representation (ﬁgure 4.5). Let us
assume a demand curve D, and a supply curve S1 for the GAS scenario. The equilibrium is reached
at quantity q1, with marginal cost MC1. In this situation, total system cost is TSC1. As the price
is equal to the marginal cost, producers make a proﬁt π1. Let us now assume that gas plants are
prohibited. The new supply curve is now illustrated by S2, and equilibrium is reached at (q2, MC2).
Although total system cost is smaller (TSC2<TSC1) the electricity price is higher (MC2>MC1).
The proﬁt generated is hence much larger (π2>π1). However, this change of supply curve creates
a loss in total net surplus (grey shaded area).
This is a speciﬁc case, although it illustrates the Swiss situation with its large hydro capacities and
renewable technologies. Furthermore, this kind of situation may be found in any system comprising
largely depreciated plants with low variable costs where new marginal technologies are relatively
expensive. The fact that, in these circumstances, marginal cost and average cost vary in opposite
directions has the advantage to make a strong example: As electricity price increase and total
system cost decrease have opposite impacts on welfare, the need to take both into account for
policy analysis is clear. Nonetheless, this holds in any case where marginal and average cost react
diﬀerently to policy shocks.
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Figure 4.5 – Partial equilibrium illustration of the loss in total net surplus due to variations in the
cost structure of electricity generation.
In the coupled framework, with general equilibrium eﬀects and the fact that supply curves are re-
optimized and change for each time-slice, things are more complex. The CGE sees changes in the
supply curve as a modiﬁcation of the electricity generation cost function: Intermediate input levels
are reduced, while proﬁt is increased. In GENESwIS, proﬁt is represented by a markup over average
costs with lump-sum recycling to the representative agent. In modeling terms, this is similar to
an output tax on electricity generation. However, the eﬃciency loss is not due to a tax-induced
distortion, but related to a natural feature of competitive pricing under diminishing returns to scale.
In our framework, proﬁt is redistributed lump-sum to the representative household. Despite munici-
palities and cantons composing the majority of shareholders in big electricity utilities in Switzerland,
this is a strong simpliﬁcation. Proﬁt may be re-invested elsewhere, possibly abroad, instead of being
re-distributed to Swiss citizens.
4.5 Conclusion
The results presented in this chapter indicate that is is not suﬃcient to look at variations of total
system cost to assess the beneﬁts of policies including technology restrictions. In the Swiss case, a
pure bottom-up analysis would overestimate the beneﬁt of the NoGAS policies. Although bottom-
up models are required to model adequately technology restrictions, the analysis should go further.
Indeed, eﬀect on price levels and associated proﬁts of such a restriction have an important impact
on welfare.
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We ﬁnd that technology restrictions alter both electricity generation cost functions and price levels.
In Switzerland, the prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants and relaxation of trade constraints have
opposite eﬀects on total system cost and marginal cost: average cost is reduced, while marginal cost
increases. In a liberalized electricity market, with marginal cost pricing, this means that, although
savings are made on average, the price of wholesale electricity rises, creating additional proﬁts.
Total system cost reductions and wholesale electricity price increase have opposite eﬀects on welfare.
It is therefore crucial for policy assessment to take both into account. This involves a framework
that permits to adequately model electricity generation costs, wholesale electricity prices, general
equilibrium eﬀects, and welfare impacts.
The analysis of these speciﬁc scenarios shows that technology restrictions can have large eﬀects
on proﬁts, which is particularly relevant with marginal cost pricing in liberalized markets. With
electricity markets being further liberalized, policy induced variations in proﬁt margins should not
be overlooked.
Average cost and wholesale electricity price varying in opposite ways is speciﬁc to our case study.
It is indeed linked to the Swiss technology mix, and heavily reliant on electricity and natural gas
import prices assumptions. If electricity foreign trade prices assumptions were to be lower than
natural gas world prices projections, the wholesale electricity price would decrease. However, these
conclusions are relevant for all situations where marginal and average cost behave diﬀerently, but
especially when the technology mix is composed of largely depreciated plants and marginal (new)
technologies are relatively expensive.
In our scenarios, the impacts of the technology restriction on electricity prices modify relative prices
of other energy carriers. The prohibition of gas-ﬁred power plants reduces greatly CO2 emissions
in the electricity generation sector. However, as other fuels become cheaper relative to electricity,
substitutions in intermediate and ﬁnal consumption increase fuel-related CO2 emissions in other
sectors and in consumption. If the purpose of technology restrictions is to reduce the environmental
impact of electricity generation, which is the case in prohibiting gas-ﬁred power plants (alongside
reducing fuel import dependence), special care should be taken for reducing sectoral leakage eﬀects.
We are careful not to rate the two scenarios simulated, or to judge on the merits and disadvan-
tages of technology restrictions in general. Indeed, bottom-up model results are heavily reliant on
assumptions regarding the evolution of import prices (both for electricity and natural gas). Also, in
GENESwIS, the marginal cost (and hence price markup) is averaged over the whole year, which is
a strong simpliﬁcation.

Chapter 5
Conclusion
The objective of this work was to investigate the interplay between the electricity market and the
economy in changing policy environments. We developed a coupled top-down bottom-up model
framework to analyze Swiss electricity markets. In particular, we focussed on the role of market
liberalization on the eﬀectiveness of energy policies (in terms of demand reduction) and on the
impacts of technology restrictions.
Our framework’s strength lies in the capacity of exploring interactions in a complex economic
system. Using this framework as a predictive model would be misguided. We therefore focus on
gaining an understanding of the mechanisms at work, and do not advance policy recommendations
speciﬁc to Switzerland, nor pass judgement on scenarios performances.
With the exception of Lanz and Rausch (2016) – who speciﬁcally diﬀerentiate utilities trading on
regulated or free markets – market liberalization assumptions are rarely discussed in coupled top-
down bottom-up analyses. However, we show that assumptions on market liberalization matter for
modeling results.
For Switzerland, an electricity tax is more eﬀective in reducing demand in a liberalized than in a
regulated market. This is due to average and marginal costs reacting diﬀerently to policy-induced
changes in demand. The exact relation between the variations of marginal and average cost depends
on the technology mix and the policy applied, and is therefore speciﬁc to each country/region.
However, the fact that they do not vary the same way can be generalized and indicates that
assumptions on market liberalization, i.e. the way bottom-up costs are linked to electricity prices,
matter. It is therefore crucial to take ongoing and projected market liberalization into account
and disclose pricing assumptions when interpreting models’ results. It also indicates that market
structure should be considered when assessing or designing policy instruments.
Bottom-up models are widely used to assess technology-related scenarios in energy modeling. How-
ever, due to their partial-equilibrium nature, they mostly report on direct costs. We show that it
is not suﬃcient to look at variations of total system cost to assess the beneﬁts of technology
restrictions. Although bottom-up models are required to model adequately technology restrictions,
the analysis should go further. This involves a framework, such as the one developed for this disser-
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tation, which permits to adequately model electricity generation costs, wholesale electricity prices,
general equilibrium eﬀects, and welfare impacts.
We show that technology restrictions can have large impacts on proﬁts, which is particularly relevant
with marginal cost pricing in liberalized markets. With electricity markets being further liberalized,
policy induced variations in proﬁt margins should not be overlooked. Our simulations also illustrate
that the timing of policies is crucial for penetration of new (clean) technologies. In our scenario,
an electricity tax is introduced in 2020, while transport fuels are taxed only from 2035 onwards. As
end-user electricity prices increase earlier, the switch to e-mobility is somewhat discouraged, and
more transport fuels continue to be used. Once transport fuels are also taxed, e-mobility becomes
more attractive.
At the end of this research, it has been shown that energy modelers must communicate and temper
their results carefully. While much has been said about the impact of assumptions on substitution
elasticities and exogenous costs projections on modeling results, this research adds to the awareness
on the eﬀects of market liberalization assumptions and choice of modeling framework on policy
assessment.
Further research
We focussed on the interplay between the electricity market and the economy in changing policy
environments in a domestic setting. Further work would beneﬁt from widening the analysis to the
impacts of non-domestic policies.
Switzerland is a small economy that is closely interlinked with Europe and the rest of the world,
with the latter inﬂuencing to a great extent the Swiss economy through trade.
This inter-linkage is even more pronounced for the electricity sector. With the liberalization of
the electricity market, electricity is traded extensively all across Europe. With the appearance of
renewable technologies, the inter-connection of the whole European network became increasingly
important. Switzerland may be aﬀected by European policies not only through political agreements,
but also through the electricity market, the emissions trading market, or fuel prices.
In principle, international integration can be modeled through exogenous assumptions (import and
export prices, world energy prices, CO2 price etc.), which is the case in the ELECTRA-CH frame-
work. This is ﬁne when analyzing Swiss policies. However, to adequately simulate impacts of
international climate and energy policy scenarios, exogenous assumptions are often not suﬃcient.
For example, variations in the electricity mix of European countries may greatly inﬂuence CO2
permit prices.
This would require the development of a larger framework with an explicit representation of Switzer-
land and its neighboring countries in both the bottom-up electricity supply component and in the
top-down multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium part. The goal of such a coupling would
be to reﬂect the high level of Switzerland’s integration into international commodity markets and
European electricity markets. Notably, it would permit one to simulate the impact of foreign climate
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and energy policies on the Swiss economy in general and on the Swiss electricity sector in particular.
The individual models for such a larger framework exist, with the CROSSTEM (Pattupara and
Kannan, 2016) model, the GENESwIS model and the multi-regional computable general equilibrium
model GEMINI-E31 (Bernard et al., 2008). In such a coupling, CROSSTEM would provide the
technological details of electricity supply and trade for Switzerland and its neighboring countries.
GENESwIS would model the Swiss economy, and GEMINI-E3 add the global trade dimension to
the framework and the possibility to explicitly model market instruments of international policies.
In building such a framework, one can foresee several challenges. Notably, issues related to the
prioritization of trade between CROSSTEM and GEMINI-E3: a choice has to be made between
prioritizing trade volume or trade revenue and as such the consistency of the model framework is
compromised. Furthermore, the CROSSTEM model minimizes the aggregate total system cost
of all modeled countries, while, in the CGE models, the agents of each country maximize their
utility/proﬁt. Also, CROSSTEM and GENESwIS are fully dynamic models, while GEMINI-E3 is
dynamic recursive.
Although this large coupling framework oﬀers thrilling prospects in terms of integrated analysis, it
might be too complex to ensure full consistency. However, further development and testing work is
needed before concluding whether or not this framework could deliver a sound analysis of integrated
electricity markets.
1http://gemini-e3.epﬂ.ch
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Appendix - GENESwIS data
5.1 Elasticities of substitution
The elasticities of substitution used in GENESwIS are listed in table 5.1.
The elasticities of substitution between capital and labor (ﬁgure 2.2 p.14), are derived from Mohler
and Müller (2012). Mohler and Müller (2012) compute elasticities for a similar structure as
GENESwIS’ for the Swiss manufacturing industry on a timeframe of 14 years and give elastici-
ties for the metal industry, sectors participating in the emissions trading scheme, and the rest of
industry. To account for long-time elasticities as much as short-time elasticities in GENESwIS, the
elasticities of substitution are set to be linearly dependent of time. As the elasticities in Mohler
and Müller (2012) are calculated on a 14 year database, these values are used for 2025 and are
doubled for 2050. A linear approximation is ﬁtted through these two points. It is assumed that the
remaining sectors will display the same elasticity as the rest of industry.
The elasticities between energy and the capital and labor nest (ﬁgure 2.2 p.14) - are taken from
Mohler and Müller (2012) for the metal industry, sectors participating in the emissions trading
scheme and the rest of industry, and from Ban and Okagawa (2008) for the other sectors. A
similar linear ﬁt as for the elasticities between capital and labor is set up. As Ban and Okagawa
(2008) compute their elasticities on a timeframe of 19 years, the base-points of the elasticities are
set in 2030, doubling in 25 years.
Elasticities of substitution for the heating nest are chosen to increase linearly from 0.5 in 2010 to
2.5 in 2050 to account for the fact that substitution is more likely in the long-term than in the
short-term due to the lifetime of existing heating installations.
Elasticities of substitution for transport were taken from Vöhringer et al. (2013) and European
Commission (1999). As gas and unreﬁned oil products, transported by pipelines, will not change
readily transport modes, the elasticities of substitution between the diﬀerent transport modes are
set to zero for the gas transport and distribution and reﬁneries sectors.
The inter temporal elasticity of substitution, which governs how households are willing to substitute
this year’s consumption for that of another year, is set to 0.2.
The Armington representation of trade treats domestic and foreign goods and services as imperfect
substitutes. Armington elasticities (table 5.2) are taken from GTAP and GTAP-E data (Hertel,
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Table 5.1 – GENESwIS’ elasticities of substitution. Refer to ﬁgure 2.2 p.14 for sectorial
production and ﬁgure 2.1 p.13 for household consumption.
Nest Sector 2010 2025 2050
Top nest all sectors 0
Between leisure and rest of consumption household cons. 1
Between capital and labor ETS1 0.202 0.505 1.01
MET2 0.200 0.500 1.000
ROI3and all others 0.237 0.594 1.189
Between capital-labor and energy ROI3 0.187 0.466 0.931
ETS1/MET2 0.208 0.519 1.039
AGR4 0.103 0.412 0.927
CMT5 0.082 0.328 0.738
GAS6/DHT7/RFU8 0.051 0.204 0.459
CON9 0.106 0.424 0.954
RLT10/RDT11/ATP12 0.056 0.224 0.504
ROS13 0.091 0.364 0.819
Between intermediate inputs and energy household cons. 0.091 0.364 0.819
Between intermediate inputs all sectors 0
household cons. 1
Energy nest all 0.2
Heat nest GAS6/DHT7/RFU8 0
others 0.5 1.25 2.5
Transport nest RFU8/GAS6 0
household cons. 1.3
others 2
Transport services nest RFU8/GAS6 0
household cons. 0.2
others 0.1
Land transport nest all sectors 0.5
Own transport nest RLT10 0.2
ATP12 none
others 10
E-mobility nest all 0
between exports and domestic production all sectors 1
1 ETS - Other sectors with emissions trading;
2 MET - Metals;
3 ROI - Rest of industry;
4 AGR - Agriculture;
5 CMT: Cement and concrete;
6 GAS - Natural gas transport and distribution;
7 DHT - District heating;
8 RFU - Reﬁneries;
9 CON - Construction;
10 RLT - Rail transport;
11 RDT - Road transport;
12 ATP - Air and other transport
13 ROS - Rest of services.
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1997; Burniaux and Truong, 2002), except for the following goods:
• No raw natural gas is mined in Switzerland, all the raw product is imported. However, the
energy disaggregated Swiss input-output table (Nathani et al., 2011) displays some domestic
production in the gas transport and distribution sector that accounts for transport and distri-
bution services. In order to keep the right technology (raw fuel in proportion with transport
and distribution costs), the Armington elasticity of natural gas is set to zero.
• Crude oil and nuclear fuels are solely imported goods, while district heat is produced only
domestically.
• When coupling GENESwIS to CROSSTEM-CH, electricity trade is governed by the CROSSTEM-
CH model.
Table 5.2 – GENESwIS’ Armington elasticities. Source: Hertel (1997) and Burniaux and Truong
(2002).
Commodity Armington elasticity
Petrol and diesel 1.9
Light heating oil 1.9
Wholesale electricity 0
Natural gas 0
Crude oil only imports
Nuclear fuel only imports
District heat only domestic
Metals 2.2
Cement and concrete 2.8
Other ETS commodities 2.05
Agricultural goods 2.47
Rest of goods 2.95
Construction 1.9
Rail transport 1.9
Road transport 1.9
Air and other transports 1.9
Rest of services 1.9
5.2 Disaggregation of input-output data
GENESwIS is based on the 2005 energy disaggregation of the Swiss input-output table (Nathani
et al., 2011). To better suit the needs of an analysis of the electricity sector and climate and energy
policies, the following disaggregation was performed:
• Value added - It is crucial for the model to separate labor, capital and income taxes. Labor
was calculated from: "full time equivalent 2005" data (T2.8a BFS) and "gross monthly
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wage according to economic sector, 2006" (BFS). Income taxes were taken from OECD
data. Capital was then set as the remainder of total value added from the input-output table.
• Cement and concrete - The non metallic mineral products sector and commodities are divided
into cement and concrete, and rest of non metallic mineral products. Data source: (Cem-
suisse, 2005, 2011). It is assumed that the whole production of the cement and concrete
commodity is consumed by the construction sector.
• Reﬁned fuels - The commodity coke and reﬁned mineral products is separated into heating
fuels, transport fuels, and other reﬁned mineral products (the latter is allocated to rest of
industry). The reﬁnery sector is kept aggregated, because of the integrated nature of its
processes. Sources: Energy NAMEA (Nathani et al., 2011), and Swiss Federal Oﬃce of
Energy (2005).
• Crude oil is separated from products of mining and quarrying. It is solely composed of imports
and demanded by the reﬁneries.
• Mineral oil - the mineral oil tax and climate cent are disaggregated per fuel type and per
sector (because of existing sectoral subsidies). Source: Energy NAMEA.
• To model insulation, an input from the construction sector is included in the heating nest. This
way, energy used for heat can be substituted against better insulation. The share of insulation
represents 5% of total construction demand, excl. own demand and road infrastructure, which
amounts for 1/3 of total construction (Körber and Kaufmann, 2007). The input of insulation
into each sector is distributed according to the respective sector’s share in total demand for
heat. This way, each sector has the same benchmark value share of insulation in its heating
nest. Insulation is not modeled for the energy sectors2 because their inputs of heating fuels
are used mostly for industrial processes rather than for heating buildings. Moreover, insulation
is not modeled for the construction and transport sectors.
5.3 Steady state calibration
GENESwIS is a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model based on a steady state growth path. In the steady
state, all quantities in the model such as capital, output, consumption, etc. grow at the same
constant rate
Q(t) = (1 + g)t ·Q(t0) (5.1)
with quantity Q, growth rate g and time-period t.
At a given period, the present value of utility is given by (( 11+r )
t ·Uti l i ty), where the factor ( 11+r )t
relates to the time preference of the consumer, reﬂected in the interest rate r .
To ensure that capital grows on the steady state path, initial investments I0 are deﬁned proportion-
2Electricity generation, electricity transport and distribution, gas transport and distribution, district heating and
reﬁneries.
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ally to the initial capital stock V K0 (see for example Paltsev, 2004) such that:
I0 =
(δ + g)V K0
δ + r
(5.2)
with growth rate g, interest rate r and discount rate δ.
We assume a growth rate of g=1%, an interest rate of r=4.5% and depreciation rate δ=4.58%.
The same interest rate is adopted in the CROSSTEM-CH model.
5.4 Baseline calibration
The chosen baseline (or reference) scenario for this study is based on the weiter wie bisher scenario
of the Swiss Energy Perspectives (Prognos, 2012). As this scenario realistically deviates from a
steady state growth path, we calibrate the model such that labor, GDP, electricity demand and
CO2 emissions follow the respective paths projected by Prognos (2012).
Labor growth is composed of two factors: (1) active population growth and (2) productivity growth.
The full-time equivalent forecast is taken from the scenario (A-00-2010) of the FSO. The SECO, in
their GDP projection, assume a productivity growth of 0.9% per year. GDP growth follows SECO
projections used in Prognos (2012).
Electricity demand per sector (industry, services, transport and households) and per use (transport,
heating and appliances), as well as CO2 emissions per fuel (natural gas, transport fuels and heating
fuels) are calibrated to follow the forecast by Prognos (2012) with the help of autonomous energy
eﬃciency indices.
5.5 Nesting structure for rail transport
Rail transport does not display the same substitution possibilities as the other sectors (see nesting
ﬁgure 5.1). Electricity enters the own-transport nest directly (no e-mobility modeled) as rail is
already largely electriﬁed.
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Figure 5.1 – Nesting structure for GENESwIS’ rail transport production function. Elasticities of
substitutions can be found in Annex 5.1.
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